[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH v4] xen/domain: unify domain ID allocation
Hi Julien, Thanks a lot for review! On Wed, Apr 23, 2025 at 12:22:39PM +0100, Julien Grall wrote: > Hi Denis, > > On 22/04/2025 22:54, dmkhn@xxxxxxxxx wrote: > > From: Denis Mukhin <dmukhin@xxxxxxxx> > > > > Currently, hypervisor code has two different non-system domain ID allocation > > algorithms: > > > > (a) Arm port allocates IDs sequentially based on max_init_domid; > > > > (b) x86 has another algorithm implementation embedded into > > XEN_DOMCTL_createdomain; does not use max_init_domid, but does > > similar > > thing wrt sequentially allocating IDs. > > I am a bit confused with this statement. This is implying the code is > only used by x86. However, XEN_DOMCTL_createdomain is common code and > used by Arm when creating domains from the toolstack. Can you clarify? Sorry for confusion. On x86, only implementation in "XEN_DOMCTL_createdomain" is used; I should have provided a clearer explanation. > With this in mind... > > > > > It makes sense to have a common helper code for such task across > > architectures > > (Arm and x86). > > ... the unification is effectively between dom0less domU allocation and > the toolstack domU allocation. Correct; I will re-phrase, once there's agreement on the direction for this patch in general. > > > > > Wrap the domain ID allocation as an arch-independent function domid_alloc() > > in > > common/domain.c. > > > > Allocation algorithm: > > - If an explicit domain ID is provided, verify its availability and > > use it if ID is unused; > > - Otherwise, perform an exhaustive search starting from the end of the used > > domain ID range, excluding hardware_domid. > > > > Move the is_free_domid() helper closer to domid_alloc(). Simplify > > is_free_domid() by removing the domain ID range check, as the ID is now > > guaranteed to be within the valid range. Additionally, update the predicate > > to > > return a bool value instead of an int. > > > > No functional change intended. > > > > Signed-off-by: Denis Mukhin <dmukhin@xxxxxxxx> > > --- > > Changes v3->v4: > > - fixed the behavior of domctl ID allocator to match the original behavior > > in case of exhaustive search > > - use domid_t input argument in domid_alloc() > > - use DOMID_INVALID as an indicator of performing an exhaustive search > > - use DOMID_INVALID as an indicator of allocator failure > > - use %pd formatting for domain ID printouts in the modified code > > - some comments fixups > > - Link to v2: > > https://lore.kernel.org/xen-devel/20250416061509.934220-1-dmukhin@xxxxxxxx/ > > - CI run: > > https://gitlab.com/xen-project/people/dmukhin/xen/-/pipelines/1780576277 > > --- > > xen/arch/arm/dom0less-build.c | 17 ++++++------ > > xen/arch/arm/domain_build.c | 17 ++++++++---- > > xen/arch/x86/setup.c | 11 +++++--- > > xen/common/domain.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > > xen/common/domctl.c | 41 +++------------------------- > > xen/include/xen/domain.h | 2 ++ > > 6 files changed, 84 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/dom0less-build.c b/xen/arch/arm/dom0less-build.c > > index a356fc94fc..61e01b7306 100644 > > --- a/xen/arch/arm/dom0less-build.c > > +++ b/xen/arch/arm/dom0less-build.c > > @@ -1038,15 +1038,13 @@ void __init create_domUs(void) > > }; > > unsigned int flags = 0U; > > bool has_dtb = false; > > + domid_t domid; > > uint32_t val; > > int rc; > > > > if ( !dt_device_is_compatible(node, "xen,domain") ) > > continue; > > > > - if ( (max_init_domid + 1) >= DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED ) > > - panic("No more domain IDs available\n"); > > - > > if ( dt_property_read_u32(node, "capabilities", &val) ) > > { > > if ( val & ~DOMAIN_CAPS_MASK ) > > @@ -1218,12 +1216,13 @@ void __init create_domUs(void) > > if ( !llc_coloring_enabled && llc_colors_str ) > > panic("'llc-colors' found, but LLC coloring is disabled\n"); > > > > - /* > > - * The variable max_init_domid is initialized with zero, so here > > it's > > - * very important to use the pre-increment operator to call > > - * domain_create() with a domid > 0. (domid == 0 is reserved for > > Dom0) > > - */ > > - d = domain_create(++max_init_domid, &d_cfg, flags); > > + domid = domid_alloc(DOMID_INVALID); > > + if ( domid == DOMID_INVALID ) > > + panic("Error allocating ID for domain %s\n", > > dt_node_name(node)); > > + if ( max_init_domid < domid ) > > + max_init_domid = domid; > > While I think it is a good idea to have a single way to allocate domain > IDs, I am a bit concerned of the change for dom0less domUs. By > introducing domid_alloc(), it will now be easier to change the behavior > of the domain ID allocation without realizing the impact for dom0less > domUs (max_init_domid is mainly used to limit the loop when switching > consoles). max_init_domid is (originally) why I am touching this code, in the context of: https://lore.kernel.org/xen-devel/20250103-vuart-ns8250-v3-v1-0-c5d36b31d66c@xxxxxxxx/ > > I think we need to document explicitely in domid_alloc() that some > callers specifically rely on the existing allocation scheme. So we need > to be careful when changing it. > > > + > > + d = domain_create(domid, &d_cfg, flags); > > if ( IS_ERR(d) ) > > panic("Error creating domain %s (rc = %ld)\n", > > dt_node_name(node), PTR_ERR(d)); > > diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/domain_build.c b/xen/arch/arm/domain_build.c > > index 270a6b97e4..fe968dd66b 100644 > > --- a/xen/arch/arm/domain_build.c > > +++ b/xen/arch/arm/domain_build.c > > @@ -2371,6 +2371,7 @@ void __init create_dom0(void) > > .grant_opts = XEN_DOMCTL_GRANT_version(opt_gnttab_max_version), > > }; > > unsigned int flags = CDF_privileged | CDF_hardware; > > + domid_t domid; > > int rc; > > > > /* The vGIC for DOM0 is exactly emulating the hardware GIC */ > > @@ -2395,19 +2396,25 @@ void __init create_dom0(void) > > if ( !llc_coloring_enabled ) > > flags |= CDF_directmap; > > > > - dom0 = domain_create(0, &dom0_cfg, flags); > > + domid = domid_alloc(get_initial_domain_id()); > > This is technically a change of behavior for Arm if the hardware_domid > is not 0. I think we need to using 0 here. If you want to change the > behavior, then this should be a separate patch with a proper explanation. I agree, it is better to isolate Arm hardware_domid-related change in a separate patch; will do that. My understanding that the code in create_dom0() should have been using hardware_domid instead of open coded 0: get_initial_domain_id() returns the value of hardware_domid on Arm, and then domid_alloc(DOMID_INVALID) in domU case should ensure that ID of get_initial_domain_id() is skipped during the domain ID search. > > > + if ( domid == DOMID_INVALID ) > > + panic("Error allocating domain ID %d\n", get_initial_domain_id()); > > + > > + dom0 = domain_create(domid, &dom0_cfg, flags); > > if ( IS_ERR(dom0) ) > > - panic("Error creating domain 0 (rc = %ld)\n", PTR_ERR(dom0)); > > + panic("Error creating domain %d (rc = %ld)\n", domid, > > PTR_ERR(dom0)); > > > > if ( llc_coloring_enabled && (rc = dom0_set_llc_colors(dom0)) ) > > - panic("Error initializing LLC coloring for domain 0 (rc = %d)\n", > > rc); > > + panic("Error initializing LLC coloring for domain %pd (rc = %d)\n", > > + dom0, rc); > > > > if ( alloc_dom0_vcpu0(dom0) == NULL ) > > - panic("Error creating domain 0 vcpu0\n"); > > + panic("Error creating domain %pdv0\n", dom0); > > > > rc = construct_dom0(dom0); > > if ( rc ) > > - panic("Could not set up DOM0 guest OS (rc = %d)\n", rc); > > + panic("Could not set up guest OS for domain %pd (rc = %d)\n", > > + dom0, rc); > > > > set_xs_domain(dom0); > > } > > diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c > > index 24b36c1a59..e61c023085 100644 > > --- a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c > > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c > > @@ -1009,8 +1009,11 @@ static struct domain *__init create_dom0(struct > > boot_info *bi) > > if ( iommu_enabled ) > > dom0_cfg.flags |= XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_iommu; > > > > - /* Create initial domain. Not d0 for pvshim. */ > > - bd->domid = get_initial_domain_id(); > > + /* Allocate initial domain ID. Not d0 for pvshim. */ > > + bd->domid = domid_alloc(get_initial_domain_id()); > > + if ( bd->domid == DOMID_INVALID ) > > + panic("Error allocating domain ID %d\n", get_initial_domain_id()); > > + > > d = domain_create(bd->domid, &dom0_cfg, > > pv_shim ? 0 : CDF_privileged | CDF_hardware); > > if ( IS_ERR(d) ) > > @@ -1038,7 +1041,7 @@ static struct domain *__init create_dom0(struct > > boot_info *bi) > > > > if ( (strlen(acpi_param) == 0) && acpi_disabled ) > > { > > - printk("ACPI is disabled, notifying Domain 0 (acpi=off)\n"); > > + printk("ACPI is disabled, notifying domain %pd (acpi=off)\n", > > d); > > safe_strcpy(acpi_param, "off"); > > } > > > > @@ -1053,7 +1056,7 @@ static struct domain *__init create_dom0(struct > > boot_info *bi) > > > > bd->d = d; > > if ( construct_dom0(bd) != 0 ) > > - panic("Could not construct domain 0\n"); > > + panic("Could not construct domain %pd\n", d); > > > > return d; > > } > > diff --git a/xen/common/domain.c b/xen/common/domain.c > > index abf1969e60..7c0f7a4990 100644 > > --- a/xen/common/domain.c > > +++ b/xen/common/domain.c > > @@ -66,6 +66,57 @@ DEFINE_RCU_READ_LOCK(domlist_read_lock); > > static struct domain *domain_hash[DOMAIN_HASH_SIZE]; > > struct domain *domain_list; > > > > +/* Domain ID allocator */ > > +static unsigned int domid_last; > > + > > +static inline bool is_free_domid(domid_t dom) > > +{ > > + struct domain *d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(dom); > > + > > + if ( d ) > > + rcu_unlock_domain(d); > > + > > + return !d; > > +} > > + > > +/* > > + * Allocate new domain ID based on the hint. > > Maybe clarify this should not be used for system domains? Agree, this I forgot to add; thanks! > > > + * > > + * If hint is outside of valid [0..DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED - 1] range of IDs, > > + * perform an exhaustive search starting from the end of the used domain ID > > + * range, excluding hardware_domid. > > + */ > > +domid_t domid_alloc(domid_t hint) > > From the name, my naive expectation is a second call to domid_alloc() > (whether concurrent or not) would return a different domid. However, > AFAICT, this is not the case. Yes, to guarantee domid_alloc() to return a different value, domid_alloc() call should be followed by domain_create() call, since domid_alloc() internally relies on the domain list. I missed that explanation. > > I am in two mind whether this is the right interface to have. I think > the minimum would be to clarify the expectation from the callers. I think that "domain ID check/allocation" can be a library function shared across all architectures, there's no need to re-implement it: it looks very unlikely new architectures will need to implement a new scheme. There's another similar domain ID check implementation coming from the hyperlaunch series, in a part of validating hyperlaunch DT; with having a library function (my current implementation still needs adjustment), hyperlaunch code can re-use it. > > > +{ > > + domid_t domid = DOMID_INVALID; > > + > > + if ( hint < DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED ) > > + { > > + /* Exact match. */ > > + if ( is_free_domid(hint) ) > > + domid = hint; > > + } > > + else > > + { > > + for ( domid = domid_last + 1; domid != domid_last; domid++ ) > > + { > > + if ( domid == DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED ) > > + domid = 0; > > + > > + if ( domid == hardware_domid ) > > + continue; > > + > > + if ( is_free_domid(domid) ) > > + break; > > + } > > + > > + if ( domid != domid_last ) > > + domid_last = domid; > > + } > > + > > + return domid; > > +} > > + > > /* > > * Insert a domain into the domlist/hash. This allows the domain to be > > looked > > * up by domid, and therefore to be the subject of hypercalls/etc. > > diff --git a/xen/common/domctl.c b/xen/common/domctl.c > > index bfe2e1f9f0..2e02139660 100644 > > --- a/xen/common/domctl.c > > +++ b/xen/common/domctl.c > > @@ -49,20 +49,6 @@ static int xenctl_bitmap_to_nodemask(nodemask_t > > *nodemask, > > MAX_NUMNODES); > > } > > > > -static inline int is_free_domid(domid_t dom) > > -{ > > - struct domain *d; > > - > > - if ( dom >= DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED ) > > - return 0; > > - > > - if ( (d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(dom)) == NULL ) > > - return 1; > > - > > - rcu_unlock_domain(d); > > - return 0; > > -} > > - > > void getdomaininfo(struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_getdomaininfo > > *info) > > { > > struct vcpu *v; > > @@ -421,34 +407,15 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_domctl_t) > > u_domctl) > > > > case XEN_DOMCTL_createdomain: > > { > > - domid_t dom; > > - static domid_t rover = 0; > > + domid_t domid = domid_alloc(op->domain); > > > > - dom = op->domain; > > - if ( (dom > 0) && (dom < DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED) ) > > + if ( domid == DOMID_INVALID ) > > { > > ret = -EEXIST; > > - if ( !is_free_domid(dom) ) > > - break; > > - } > > - else > > - { > > - for ( dom = rover + 1; dom != rover; dom++ ) > > - { > > - if ( dom == DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED ) > > - dom = 1; > > - if ( is_free_domid(dom) ) > > - break; > > - } > > - > > - ret = -ENOMEM; > > - if ( dom == rover ) > > - break; > > - > > - rover = dom; > > + break; > > } > > > > - d = domain_create(dom, &op->u.createdomain, false); > > + d = domain_create(domid, &op->u.createdomain, false); > > if ( IS_ERR(d) ) > > { > > ret = PTR_ERR(d); > > diff --git a/xen/include/xen/domain.h b/xen/include/xen/domain.h > > index e10baf2615..43e9411fc0 100644 > > --- a/xen/include/xen/domain.h > > +++ b/xen/include/xen/domain.h > > @@ -38,6 +38,8 @@ void arch_get_domain_info(const struct domain *d, > > > > domid_t get_initial_domain_id(void); > > > > +domid_t domid_alloc(domid_t hint); > > + > > /* CDF_* constant. Internal flags for domain creation. */ > > /* Is this a privileged domain? */ > > #define CDF_privileged (1U << 0) > > Cheers, > > -- > Julien Grall >
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