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Re: [PATCH 00/21] x86: Trenchboot Secure Launch DRTM (Xen)
- To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
- From: Nicola Vetrini <nicola.vetrini@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 22 Apr 2025 21:01:04 +0200
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- Cc: Sergii Dmytruk <sergii.dmytruk@xxxxxxxxx>, xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>, Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>, Lukasz Hawrylko <lukasz@xxxxxxxxxxx>, "Daniel P. Smith" <dpsmith@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Mateusz Mówka <mateusz.mowka@xxxxxxxxx>, Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@xxxxxxxxxx>, Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@xxxxxxx>, Julien Grall <julien@xxxxxxx>, Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, trenchboot-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Delivery-date: Tue, 22 Apr 2025 19:01:23 +0000
- List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>
On 2025-04-22 19:14, Andrew Cooper wrote:
On 22/04/2025 4:06 pm, Sergii Dmytruk wrote:
The aim of the [TrenchBoot] project is to provide an implementation of
DRTM that is generic enough to cover various use cases:
- Intel TXT and AMD SKINIT on x86 CPUs
- legacy and UEFI boot
- TPM1.2 and TPM2.0
- (in the future) DRTM on Arm CPUs
DRTM is a version of a measured launch that starts on request rather
than at the start of a boot cycle. One of its advantages is in not
including the firmware in the chain of trust.
Xen already supports DRTM via [tboot] which targets Intel TXT only.
tboot employs encapsulates some of the DRTM details within itself
while
with TrenchBoot Xen (or Linux) is meant to be a self-contained payload
for a TrenchBoot-enabled bootloader (think GRUB). The one exception
is
that UEFI case requires calling back into bootloader to initiate DRTM,
which is necessary to give Xen a chance of querying all the
information
it needs from the firmware before performing DRTM start.
From reading the above tboot might seem like a more abstracted, but
the
reality is that the payload needs to have DRTM-specific knowledge
either
way. TrenchBoot in principle allows coming up with independent
implementations of bootloaders and payloads that are compatible with
each other.
The "x86/boot: choose AP stack based on APIC ID" patch is shared with
[Parallelize AP bring-up] series which is required here because Intel
TXT always releases all APs simultaneously. The rest of the patches
are
unique.
I've stripped out the sha2 patch and fixed up to use the existing sha2,
then kicked off some CI testing:
https://gitlab.com/xen-project/hardware/xen-staging/-/pipelines/1780285393
https://cirrus-ci.com/build/5452335868018688
When the dust has settled, I'll talk you through the failures.
Accidental use of C18 here
https://saas.eclairit.com:3787/fs/var/local/eclair/xen-project.ecdf/xen-project/hardware/xen-staging/ECLAIR_normal/andrew/tb-v1.1/X86_64/9791028023/PROJECT.ecd;/by_service/MC3A2.D1.1.html
~Andrew
--
Nicola Vetrini, B.Sc.
Software Engineer
BUGSENG (https://bugseng.com)
LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/nicola-vetrini-a42471253
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