[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH v3 1/3] x86/dom0: correctly set the maximum ->iomem_caps bound for PVH
On 20.02.2025 09:49, Roger Pau Monné wrote: > On Thu, Feb 20, 2025 at 09:22:40AM +0100, Jan Beulich wrote: >> On 19.02.2025 17:48, Roger Pau Monne wrote: >>> The logic in dom0_setup_permissions() sets the maximum bound in >>> ->iomem_caps unconditionally using paddr_bits, which is not correct for HVM >>> based domains. Instead use domain_max_paddr_bits() to get the correct >>> maximum paddr bits for each possible domain type. >>> >>> Switch to using PFN_DOWN() instead of PAGE_SHIFT, as that's shorter. >>> >>> Fixes: 53de839fb409 ('x86: constrain MFN range Dom0 may access') >>> Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> >>> --- >>> The fixes tag might be dubious, IIRC at that time we had PVHv1 dom0, which >>> would likely also need such adjustment, but not the current PVHv2. >> >> Probably better to omit it then. It would be one of the changes moving to >> PVHv2 that missed making the adjustment. > > Well, PVHv1 would have needed such adjustment, as it was also limited > to hap_paddr_bits instead of paddr_bits. Looks like I mis-interpreted your sentence then. >>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/dom0_build.c >>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/dom0_build.c >>> @@ -481,7 +481,8 @@ int __init dom0_setup_permissions(struct domain *d) >>> >>> /* The hardware domain is initially permitted full I/O capabilities. */ >>> rc = ioports_permit_access(d, 0, 0xFFFF); >>> - rc |= iomem_permit_access(d, 0UL, (1UL << (paddr_bits - PAGE_SHIFT)) - >>> 1); >>> + rc |= iomem_permit_access(d, 0UL, >>> + PFN_DOWN(1UL << domain_max_paddr_bits(d)) - >>> 1); >> >> Why PFN_DOWN() rather than subtracting PAGE_SHIFT? That's two shifts rather >> than just one. > > cosmetic: line length (it's mentioned in the commit message). Oh, I had overlooked that sentence there. > I can > switch back to PAGE_SHIFT, didn't think it was a big deal since it's > a one time only calculation. Feel free to keep as is then. I agree it's not a big deal here; my worry with such usually is that people seeing something in one place may then copy/clone the same to use elsewhere. Jan
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