Re: [PATCH v4 29/30] x86/mm, mm/vmalloc: Defer flush_tlb_kernel_range() targeting NOHZ_FULL CPUs

[Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>]

On 2/19/25 07:13, Valentin Schneider wrote:
>> Maybe I missed part of the discussion though. Is VMEMMAP your only
>> concern? I would have guessed that the more generic vmalloc()
>> functionality would be harder to pin down.
> Urgh, that'll teach me to send emails that late - I did indeed mean the
> vmalloc() range, not at all VMEMMAP. IIUC *neither* are present in the user
> kPTI page table and AFAICT the page table swap is done before the actual 
> vmap'd
> stack (CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y) gets used.

OK, so rewriting your question... ;)

> So what if the vmalloc() range *isn't* in the CR3 tree when a CPU is
> executing in userspace?

The LDT and maybe the PEBS buffers are the only implicit supervisor
accesses to vmalloc()'d memory that I can think of. But those are both
handled specially and shouldn't ever get zapped while in use. The LDT
replacement has its own IPIs separate from TLB flushing.

But I'm actually not all that worried about accesses while actually
running userspace. It's that "danger zone" in the kernel between entry
and when the TLB might have dangerous garbage in it.

BTW, I hope this whole thing is turned off on 32-bit. There, we can
actually take and handle faults on the vmalloc() area. If you get one of
those faults in your "danger zone", it'll start running page fault code
which will branch out to god-knows-where and certainly isn't noinstr.