[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

Re: [PATCH] x86/svm: Separate STI and VMRUN instructions in svm_asm_do_resume()


  • To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
  • From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Tue, 18 Feb 2025 12:25:08 +0100
  • Autocrypt: addr=jbeulich@xxxxxxxx; keydata= xsDiBFk3nEQRBADAEaSw6zC/EJkiwGPXbWtPxl2xCdSoeepS07jW8UgcHNurfHvUzogEq5xk hu507c3BarVjyWCJOylMNR98Yd8VqD9UfmX0Hb8/BrA+Hl6/DB/eqGptrf4BSRwcZQM32aZK 7Pj2XbGWIUrZrd70x1eAP9QE3P79Y2oLrsCgbZJfEwCgvz9JjGmQqQkRiTVzlZVCJYcyGGsD /0tbFCzD2h20ahe8rC1gbb3K3qk+LpBtvjBu1RY9drYk0NymiGbJWZgab6t1jM7sk2vuf0Py O9Hf9XBmK0uE9IgMaiCpc32XV9oASz6UJebwkX+zF2jG5I1BfnO9g7KlotcA/v5ClMjgo6Gl MDY4HxoSRu3i1cqqSDtVlt+AOVBJBACrZcnHAUSuCXBPy0jOlBhxPqRWv6ND4c9PH1xjQ3NP nxJuMBS8rnNg22uyfAgmBKNLpLgAGVRMZGaGoJObGf72s6TeIqKJo/LtggAS9qAUiuKVnygo 3wjfkS9A3DRO+SpU7JqWdsveeIQyeyEJ/8PTowmSQLakF+3fote9ybzd880fSmFuIEJldWxp Y2ggPGpiZXVsaWNoQHN1c2UuY29tPsJgBBMRAgAgBQJZN5xEAhsDBgsJCAcDAgQVAggDBBYC AwECHgECF4AACgkQoDSui/t3IH4J+wCfQ5jHdEjCRHj23O/5ttg9r9OIruwAn3103WUITZee e7Sbg12UgcQ5lv7SzsFNBFk3nEQQCACCuTjCjFOUdi5Nm244F+78kLghRcin/awv+IrTcIWF hUpSs1Y91iQQ7KItirz5uwCPlwejSJDQJLIS+QtJHaXDXeV6NI0Uef1hP20+y8qydDiVkv6l IreXjTb7DvksRgJNvCkWtYnlS3mYvQ9NzS9PhyALWbXnH6sIJd2O9lKS1Mrfq+y0IXCP10eS FFGg+Av3IQeFatkJAyju0PPthyTqxSI4lZYuJVPknzgaeuJv/2NccrPvmeDg6Coe7ZIeQ8Yj t0ARxu2xytAkkLCel1Lz1WLmwLstV30g80nkgZf/wr+/BXJW/oIvRlonUkxv+IbBM3dX2OV8 AmRv1ySWPTP7AAMFB/9PQK/VtlNUJvg8GXj9ootzrteGfVZVVT4XBJkfwBcpC/XcPzldjv+3 HYudvpdNK3lLujXeA5fLOH+Z/G9WBc5pFVSMocI71I8bT8lIAzreg0WvkWg5V2WZsUMlnDL9 mpwIGFhlbM3gfDMs7MPMu8YQRFVdUvtSpaAs8OFfGQ0ia3LGZcjA6Ik2+xcqscEJzNH+qh8V m5jjp28yZgaqTaRbg3M/+MTbMpicpZuqF4rnB0AQD12/3BNWDR6bmh+EkYSMcEIpQmBM51qM EKYTQGybRCjpnKHGOxG0rfFY1085mBDZCH5Kx0cl0HVJuQKC+dV2ZY5AqjcKwAxpE75MLFkr wkkEGBECAAkFAlk3nEQCGwwACgkQoDSui/t3IH7nnwCfcJWUDUFKdCsBH/E5d+0ZnMQi+G0A nAuWpQkjM1ASeQwSHEeAWPgskBQL
  • Cc: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>, Xen-devel <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Delivery-date: Tue, 18 Feb 2025 11:25:13 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>

On 17.02.2025 18:40, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 17/02/2025 4:51 pm, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> On 17.02.2025 17:12, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>>> There is a corner case in the VMRUN instruction where its INTR_SHADOW state
>>> leaks into guest state if a VMExit occurs before the VMRUN is complete.  An
>>> example of this could be taking #NPF due to event injection.
>> Ouch.
> 
> Yeah.  Intel go out of their way to make VM{LAUNCH,RESUME} fail if
> they're executed in a shadow.
> 
>>
>>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/entry.S
>>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/entry.S
>>> @@ -57,6 +57,14 @@ __UNLIKELY_END(nsvm_hap)
>>>  
>>>          clgi
>>>  
>>> +        /*
>>> +         * Set EFLAGS.IF, after CLGI covers us from real interrupts, but 
>>> not
>>> +         * immediately prior to VMRUN.  AMD CPUs leak Xen's INTR_SHADOW 
>>> from
>>> +         * the STI into guest state if a VMExit occurs during VMEntry
>>> +         * (e.g. taking #NPF during event injecting.)
>>> +         */
>>> +        sti
>>> +
>>>          /* WARNING! `ret`, `call *`, `jmp *` not safe beyond this point. */
>>>          /* SPEC_CTRL_EXIT_TO_SVM       Req: b=curr %rsp=regs/cpuinfo, 
>>> Clob: acd */
>>>          .macro svm_vmentry_spec_ctrl
>> I'm mildly worried to see it moved this high up. Any exception taken in
>> this exit code would consider the system to have interrupts enabled, when
>> we have more restrictive handling for the IF=0 case. Could we meet in the
>> middle and have STI before we start popping registers off the stack, but
>> after all the speculation machinery?
> 
> Any exception taken here is fatal, and going to fail in weird ways. 
> e.g. we don't clean up GIF before entering the crash kernel.
> 
> But yes, we probably should take steps to avoid the interrupted context
> from looking even more weird than usual.
> 
> I'll put it above the line of pops.  They're going to turn into a single
> macro when I can dust off that series.

Then:
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>

Jan



 


Rackspace

Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our
servers 24x7x365 and backed by RackSpace's Fanatical Support®.