[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [PATCH] xen/memory: Make resource_max_frames() to return 0 on unknown type
From: Oleksandr Tyshchenko <oleksandr_tyshchenko@xxxxxxxx> This is actually what the caller acquire_resource() expects on any kind of error (the comment on top of resource_max_frames() also suggests that). Otherwise, the caller will treat -errno as a valid value and propagate incorrect nr_frames to the VM. As a possible consequence, a VM trying to query a resource size of an unknown type will get the success result from the hypercall and obtain nr_frames 4294967201. Fixes: 9244528955de ("xen/memory: Fix acquire_resource size semantics") Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Tyshchenko <oleksandr_tyshchenko@xxxxxxxx> --- I am not aware of any real issues with that. I just spotted that when looking into the code. Also, I don't think there is a similar issue with acquiring resource of an unknown type. Another possible more invasive solution could be to make resource_max_frames() return int (+ clarify a comment on top of it) and teach the caller to also deal with -errno returned on error (in addition to 0). This way we can propagate an exact error (-EOPNOTSUPP) to the VM on an unknown type. The cons are that we limit max_frames, but it seems to me that nr_frames is limited even harder anyway down the code to fit into high-order bits of the cmd parameter to be able to properly encode a continuation. --- --- xen/common/memory.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/xen/common/memory.c b/xen/common/memory.c index a6f2f6d1b3..6ec471237b 100644 --- a/xen/common/memory.c +++ b/xen/common/memory.c @@ -1157,7 +1157,7 @@ static unsigned int resource_max_frames(const struct domain *d, return d->vmtrace_size >> PAGE_SHIFT; default: - return -EOPNOTSUPP; + return 0; } } -- 2.34.1
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