[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH] Design docs: Fix some typos in the design docs
On Wed, 15 Jan 2025, Frediano Ziglio wrote: > On Wed, Jan 15, 2025 at 1:45 PM Bernhard Kaindl > <bernhard.kaindl@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > Skimming through the design docs, I saw some typos that needed fixing. > > > > --- > > Comments for reviewers (not for the commit message itself): > > > > Sample typos (some are not easy to spot): > > - heirarchical: (ei->ie) > > - implementaiton: (it->ti) > > - comprimised: (i->o) > > - contol->control (r) > > > > PS: I did the fixes using LTeX in an IDE and re-checked the mail too. > > > > Signed-off-by: Bernhard Kaindl <bernhard.kaindl@xxxxxxxxx> > > --- > > docs/designs/argo.pandoc | 4 ++-- > > docs/designs/nested-svm-cpu-features.md | 12 ++++++------ > > docs/designs/qemu-deprivilege.md | 8 ++++---- > > docs/designs/xenstore-migration.md | 2 +- > > docs/features/qemu-deprivilege.pandoc | 2 +- > > 5 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/docs/designs/argo.pandoc b/docs/designs/argo.pandoc > > index e18aacea7c..cd854d2a7a 100644 > > --- a/docs/designs/argo.pandoc > > +++ b/docs/designs/argo.pandoc > > @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ concurrency. > > > > Avoidance of deadlock is essential and since state must frequently be > > updated > > that pertains to more than one domain, a locking protocol defines which > > locks > > -are needed and the order of their acquistion. > > +are needed and the order of their acquisition. > > > > ## Structure > > > > @@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ by the domain. > > > > ## Hierarchical Locking Model and Protocol > > > > -The locking discipline within the Argo code is heirarchical and utilizes > > +The locking discipline within the Argo code is hierarchical and utilizes > > reader/writer locks to enable increased concurrency when operations do not > > conflict. None of the Argo locks are reentrant. > > > > diff --git a/docs/designs/nested-svm-cpu-features.md > > b/docs/designs/nested-svm-cpu-features.md > > index 837a96df05..c855748141 100644 > > --- a/docs/designs/nested-svm-cpu-features.md > > +++ b/docs/designs/nested-svm-cpu-features.md > > @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ leaf 8000000A:edx > > from the L1 hypervisor's perspective to be as close as possible to > > the original hardware. In particular, the behavior of the hardware > > on error paths 1) is not easy to understand or test, 2) can be the > > - source of surprising vulnerabiliies. (See XSA-7 for an example of a > > + source of surprising vulnerabilities. (See XSA-7 for an example of a > > case where subtle error-handling differences can open up a privilege > > escalation.) We should avoid emulating any bit of the hardware with > > complex error paths if we can at all help it. > > @@ -59,11 +59,11 @@ leaf 8000000A:edx > > > > - 2 `SVML` *SVM Lock*: Not required for L0, not provided to L1 > > > > - Seems to be aboult enabling an operating system to prevent "blue > > + Seems to be about enabling an operating system to prevent "blue > > pill" attacks against itself. > > > > Xen doesn't use it, nor provide it; so it would need to be > > - implementend. The best way to protect a guest OS is to leave nested > > + implemented. The best way to protect a guest OS is to leave nested > > virt disabled in the tools. > > > > - 3 `NRIPS` NRIP Save: Require for both L0 and L1 > > @@ -78,8 +78,8 @@ leaf 8000000A:edx > > The main putative use for this would be trying to maintain an > > invariant TSC across cores with different clock speeds, or after a > > migrate. Unlike others, this doesn't have an error path to worry > > - about compatibility-wise; and according to tests done when nestedSVM > > - was first implemented, it's actually faster to emliate TscRateMSR in > > + about compatibility-wise; and according to tests done when nested SVM > > + was first implemented, it's actually faster to emulate TscRateMSR in > > the L0 hypervisor than for L1 to attempt to emulate it itself. > > > > However, using this properly in L0 will take some implementation > > @@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ leaf 8000000A:edx > > - 5 `VmcbClean`: VMCB Clean Bits: Not required by L0, provide to L1 > > > > This is a pure optimization, both on the side of the L0 and L1. The > > - implementaiton for L1 is entirely Xen-side, so can be provided even > > + implementation for L1 is entirely Xen-side, so can be provided even > > on hardware that doesn't provide it. And it's purely an > > optimization, so could be "implemented" by ignoring the bits > > entirely. > > diff --git a/docs/designs/qemu-deprivilege.md > > b/docs/designs/qemu-deprivilege.md > > index f12b1a3ae3..603491f24d 100644 > > --- a/docs/designs/qemu-deprivilege.md > > +++ b/docs/designs/qemu-deprivilege.md > > @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ The following restrictions are currently implemented. > > '''Description''': As mentioned above, having QEMU switch to a > > non-root user, one per domain id. Not being the root user limits what > > a compromised QEMU process can do to the system, and having one user > > -per domain id limits what a comprimised QEMU process can do to the > > +per domain id limits what a compromised QEMU process can do to the > > QEMU processes of other VMs. > > > > '''Implementation''': The toolstack adds the following to the qemu > > command-line: > > @@ -79,8 +79,8 @@ Then adds the following to the qemu command-line: > > ## Namespaces for unused functionality (Linux only) > > > > '''Description''': QEMU doesn't use the functionality associated with > > -mount and IPC namespaces. (IPC namespaces contol non-file-based IPC > > -mechanisms within the kernel; unix and network sockets are not > > +mount and IPC namespaces. (IPC namespaces control non-file-based IPC > > +mechanisms within the kernel; Unix and network sockets are not > > affected by this.) Making separate namespaces for these for QEMU > > won't affect normal operation, but it does mean that even if other > > restrictions fail, the process won't be able to even name system mount > > @@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ executing QEMU. (But this would then require other > > changes to create > > the QMP socket, VNC socket, and so on). > > > > It should be noted that `-sandbox` is implemented as a blacklist, not > > -a whitelist; that is, it disables known-unsed functionality which may > > +a whitelist; that is, it disables known-unused functionality which may > > be harmful, rather than disabling all functionality except that known > > to be safe and needed. This is unfortunately necessary since qemu > > doesn't know what system calls libraries might end up making. (See > > diff --git a/docs/designs/xenstore-migration.md > > b/docs/designs/xenstore-migration.md > > index 5022268386..082314bf72 100644 > > --- a/docs/designs/xenstore-migration.md > > +++ b/docs/designs/xenstore-migration.md > > @@ -372,7 +372,7 @@ or modified by a transaction for which there is also a > > `TRANSACTION_DATA` > > record previously present). > > > > Each _committed_ node in the stream is required to have an already known > > parent > > -node. A parent node is known if it was either in the node data base before > > the > > +node. A parent node is known if it was either in the node database before > > the > > stream was started to be processed, or if a `NODE_DATA` record for that > > parent > > node has already been processed in the stream. > > > > diff --git a/docs/features/qemu-deprivilege.pandoc > > b/docs/features/qemu-deprivilege.pandoc > > index 4ef119c821..915e38d8c9 100644 > > --- a/docs/features/qemu-deprivilege.pandoc > > +++ b/docs/features/qemu-deprivilege.pandoc > > @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ dm_restrict is a set of operations to restrict QEMU > > running in domain > > > > 1. Mechanisms to restrict QEMU to only being able to affect its own > > domain > > - 2. Mechanisms to restruct QEMU's ability to interact with domain 0. > > + 2. Mechanisms to restrict QEMU's ability to interact with domain 0. > > > > # User details > > > > Reviewed-by: Frediano Ziglio <frediano.ziglio@xxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>
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