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Re: [PATCH v3 0/3] Add stack protector


  • To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
  • From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Thu, 12 Dec 2024 15:30:06 +0100
  • Autocrypt: addr=jbeulich@xxxxxxxx; keydata= xsDiBFk3nEQRBADAEaSw6zC/EJkiwGPXbWtPxl2xCdSoeepS07jW8UgcHNurfHvUzogEq5xk hu507c3BarVjyWCJOylMNR98Yd8VqD9UfmX0Hb8/BrA+Hl6/DB/eqGptrf4BSRwcZQM32aZK 7Pj2XbGWIUrZrd70x1eAP9QE3P79Y2oLrsCgbZJfEwCgvz9JjGmQqQkRiTVzlZVCJYcyGGsD /0tbFCzD2h20ahe8rC1gbb3K3qk+LpBtvjBu1RY9drYk0NymiGbJWZgab6t1jM7sk2vuf0Py O9Hf9XBmK0uE9IgMaiCpc32XV9oASz6UJebwkX+zF2jG5I1BfnO9g7KlotcA/v5ClMjgo6Gl MDY4HxoSRu3i1cqqSDtVlt+AOVBJBACrZcnHAUSuCXBPy0jOlBhxPqRWv6ND4c9PH1xjQ3NP nxJuMBS8rnNg22uyfAgmBKNLpLgAGVRMZGaGoJObGf72s6TeIqKJo/LtggAS9qAUiuKVnygo 3wjfkS9A3DRO+SpU7JqWdsveeIQyeyEJ/8PTowmSQLakF+3fote9ybzd880fSmFuIEJldWxp Y2ggPGpiZXVsaWNoQHN1c2UuY29tPsJgBBMRAgAgBQJZN5xEAhsDBgsJCAcDAgQVAggDBBYC AwECHgECF4AACgkQoDSui/t3IH4J+wCfQ5jHdEjCRHj23O/5ttg9r9OIruwAn3103WUITZee e7Sbg12UgcQ5lv7SzsFNBFk3nEQQCACCuTjCjFOUdi5Nm244F+78kLghRcin/awv+IrTcIWF hUpSs1Y91iQQ7KItirz5uwCPlwejSJDQJLIS+QtJHaXDXeV6NI0Uef1hP20+y8qydDiVkv6l IreXjTb7DvksRgJNvCkWtYnlS3mYvQ9NzS9PhyALWbXnH6sIJd2O9lKS1Mrfq+y0IXCP10eS FFGg+Av3IQeFatkJAyju0PPthyTqxSI4lZYuJVPknzgaeuJv/2NccrPvmeDg6Coe7ZIeQ8Yj t0ARxu2xytAkkLCel1Lz1WLmwLstV30g80nkgZf/wr+/BXJW/oIvRlonUkxv+IbBM3dX2OV8 AmRv1ySWPTP7AAMFB/9PQK/VtlNUJvg8GXj9ootzrteGfVZVVT4XBJkfwBcpC/XcPzldjv+3 HYudvpdNK3lLujXeA5fLOH+Z/G9WBc5pFVSMocI71I8bT8lIAzreg0WvkWg5V2WZsUMlnDL9 mpwIGFhlbM3gfDMs7MPMu8YQRFVdUvtSpaAs8OFfGQ0ia3LGZcjA6Ik2+xcqscEJzNH+qh8V m5jjp28yZgaqTaRbg3M/+MTbMpicpZuqF4rnB0AQD12/3BNWDR6bmh+EkYSMcEIpQmBM51qM EKYTQGybRCjpnKHGOxG0rfFY1085mBDZCH5Kx0cl0HVJuQKC+dV2ZY5AqjcKwAxpE75MLFkr wkkEGBECAAkFAlk3nEQCGwwACgkQoDSui/t3IH7nnwCfcJWUDUFKdCsBH/E5d+0ZnMQi+G0A nAuWpQkjM1ASeQwSHEeAWPgskBQL
  • Cc: Julien Grall <julien@xxxxxxx>, Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>, Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@xxxxxxxxxx>, Samuel Thibault <samuel.thibault@xxxxxxxxxxxx>, Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>, Bertrand Marquis <bertrand.marquis@xxxxxxx>, Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@xxxxxxx>, "xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Volodymyr Babchuk <Volodymyr_Babchuk@xxxxxxxx>
  • Delivery-date: Thu, 12 Dec 2024 14:30:11 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>

On 12.12.2024 02:17, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> (With the knowledge that this is a disputed Kconfig pattern, and will
> need rebasing), the way I want this to work is simply:
> 
> diff --git a/xen/Makefile b/xen/Makefile
> index 0de0101fd0bf..5d0a88fb3c3f 100644
> --- a/xen/Makefile
> +++ b/xen/Makefile
> @@ -434,6 +434,9 @@ endif
>  
>  ifeq ($(CONFIG_STACK_PROTECTOR),y)
>  CFLAGS += -fstack-protector
> +ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86),y)
> +CFLAGS += -mstack-protector-guard=global
> +endif
>  else
>  CFLAGS += -fno-stack-protector
>  endif
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/Kconfig b/xen/arch/x86/Kconfig
> index 9cdd04721afa..7951ca908b36 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/Kconfig
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/Kconfig
> @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ config X86
>         select HAS_PCI_MSI
>         select HAS_PIRQ
>         select HAS_SCHED_GRANULARITY
> +       select HAS_STACK_PROTECTOR if
> $(cc-option,-mstack-protector-guard=global)
>         select HAS_UBSAN
>         select HAS_VMAP
>         select HAS_VPCI if HVM
> 
> 
> 
> Sadly, it doesn't build.  I get a handful of:
> 
> prelink.o: in function `cmdline_parse':
> /home/andrew/xen.git/xen/common/kernel.c:216:(.init.text+0x20f2): failed
> to convert GOTPCREL relocation against '__stack_chk_guard'; relink with
> --no-relax
> /home/andrew/xen.git/xen/common/kernel.c:230:(.init.text+0x246f): failed
> to convert GOTPCREL relocation against '__stack_chk_guard'; relink with
> --no-relax
> 
> which is more toolchain-whispering than I feel like doing tonight.

Imo the root of the problem is that the compiler doesn't itself mark
__stack_chk_guard hidden (it does so for __stack_chk_fail, albeit only for
32-bit code), and hence finds it necessary to use @gotpcrel to access the
variable. Even if the linker managed to relax all of these, it would then
still be less efficient compared to direct RIP-relative accesses.

I also can't see how we might be able to override the compiler's internal
declaration to mark it hidden (the same appears to be true for other items
the declares internally, like the retpoline thunks or even strcmp() et al).
Passing -fvisibility=hidden doesn't make a difference (just as another
data point).

Playing with -fstack-protector* flavors, I observe:
- -fstack-protector causing several failures, like you observed, oddly
  enough exclusively from __init functions,
- -fstack-protector-all and -fstack-protector-strong each causing a single
  (but respectively different) failure, for apparently random non-__init
  functions.
Taking this together it very much smells like a linker issue. I'll see
about checking there further.

Jan



 


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