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Re: [PATCH v4 5/7] xen/riscv: introduce and initialize SBI RFENCE extension


  • To: oleksii.kurochko@xxxxxxxxx
  • From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2024 17:53:12 +0200
  • Autocrypt: addr=jbeulich@xxxxxxxx; keydata= xsDiBFk3nEQRBADAEaSw6zC/EJkiwGPXbWtPxl2xCdSoeepS07jW8UgcHNurfHvUzogEq5xk hu507c3BarVjyWCJOylMNR98Yd8VqD9UfmX0Hb8/BrA+Hl6/DB/eqGptrf4BSRwcZQM32aZK 7Pj2XbGWIUrZrd70x1eAP9QE3P79Y2oLrsCgbZJfEwCgvz9JjGmQqQkRiTVzlZVCJYcyGGsD /0tbFCzD2h20ahe8rC1gbb3K3qk+LpBtvjBu1RY9drYk0NymiGbJWZgab6t1jM7sk2vuf0Py O9Hf9XBmK0uE9IgMaiCpc32XV9oASz6UJebwkX+zF2jG5I1BfnO9g7KlotcA/v5ClMjgo6Gl MDY4HxoSRu3i1cqqSDtVlt+AOVBJBACrZcnHAUSuCXBPy0jOlBhxPqRWv6ND4c9PH1xjQ3NP nxJuMBS8rnNg22uyfAgmBKNLpLgAGVRMZGaGoJObGf72s6TeIqKJo/LtggAS9qAUiuKVnygo 3wjfkS9A3DRO+SpU7JqWdsveeIQyeyEJ/8PTowmSQLakF+3fote9ybzd880fSmFuIEJldWxp Y2ggPGpiZXVsaWNoQHN1c2UuY29tPsJgBBMRAgAgBQJZN5xEAhsDBgsJCAcDAgQVAggDBBYC AwECHgECF4AACgkQoDSui/t3IH4J+wCfQ5jHdEjCRHj23O/5ttg9r9OIruwAn3103WUITZee e7Sbg12UgcQ5lv7SzsFNBFk3nEQQCACCuTjCjFOUdi5Nm244F+78kLghRcin/awv+IrTcIWF hUpSs1Y91iQQ7KItirz5uwCPlwejSJDQJLIS+QtJHaXDXeV6NI0Uef1hP20+y8qydDiVkv6l IreXjTb7DvksRgJNvCkWtYnlS3mYvQ9NzS9PhyALWbXnH6sIJd2O9lKS1Mrfq+y0IXCP10eS FFGg+Av3IQeFatkJAyju0PPthyTqxSI4lZYuJVPknzgaeuJv/2NccrPvmeDg6Coe7ZIeQ8Yj t0ARxu2xytAkkLCel1Lz1WLmwLstV30g80nkgZf/wr+/BXJW/oIvRlonUkxv+IbBM3dX2OV8 AmRv1ySWPTP7AAMFB/9PQK/VtlNUJvg8GXj9ootzrteGfVZVVT4XBJkfwBcpC/XcPzldjv+3 HYudvpdNK3lLujXeA5fLOH+Z/G9WBc5pFVSMocI71I8bT8lIAzreg0WvkWg5V2WZsUMlnDL9 mpwIGFhlbM3gfDMs7MPMu8YQRFVdUvtSpaAs8OFfGQ0ia3LGZcjA6Ik2+xcqscEJzNH+qh8V m5jjp28yZgaqTaRbg3M/+MTbMpicpZuqF4rnB0AQD12/3BNWDR6bmh+EkYSMcEIpQmBM51qM EKYTQGybRCjpnKHGOxG0rfFY1085mBDZCH5Kx0cl0HVJuQKC+dV2ZY5AqjcKwAxpE75MLFkr wkkEGBECAAkFAlk3nEQCGwwACgkQoDSui/t3IH7nnwCfcJWUDUFKdCsBH/E5d+0ZnMQi+G0A nAuWpQkjM1ASeQwSHEeAWPgskBQL
  • Cc: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@xxxxxxx>, Bob Eshleman <bobbyeshleman@xxxxxxxxx>, Connor Davis <connojdavis@xxxxxxxxx>, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>, Julien Grall <julien@xxxxxxx>, Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>, xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Delivery-date: Wed, 14 Aug 2024 15:53:19 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>

On 14.08.2024 17:41, oleksii.kurochko@xxxxxxxxx wrote:
> On Tue, 2024-08-13 at 11:34 +0200, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> On 09.08.2024 18:19, Oleksii Kurochko wrote:
>>> +static unsigned long sbi_major_version(void)
>>> +{
>>> +    return (sbi_spec_version >> SBI_SPEC_VERSION_MAJOR_SHIFT) &
>>> +        SBI_SPEC_VERSION_MAJOR_MASK;
>>> +}
>>
>> Can you use MASK_EXTR() here, allowing to even drop the separate
>> SBI_SPEC_VERSION_MAJOR_SHIFT?
> I am not sure that:
> (sbi_spec_version >> SBI_SPEC_VERSION_MAJOR_SHIFT) & 
> SBI_SPEC_VERSION_MAJOR_MASK == MASK_EXTR(sbi_spec_version,
> SBI_SPEC_VERSION_MAJOR_MASK)

How come you're not sure? That's precisely what MASK_EXTR() is for.

>>> +static long sbi_ext_base_func(long fid)
>>> +{
>>> +    struct sbiret ret;
>>> +
>>> +    ret = sbi_ecall(SBI_EXT_BASE, fid, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
>>> +    if ( !ret.error )
>>> +        return ret.value;
>>> +    else
>>> +        return ret.error;
>>
>> With the folding of two distinct values, how is the caller going to
>> tell failure from success?
> By checking if the return value is < 0.
> According to the SBI spec [
> https://github.com/riscv-non-isa/riscv-sbi-doc/blob/master/src/binary-encoding.adoc?plain=1#L32
> ] ret.error can be or 0 ( which means success ) or something < 0 if it
> was a failure.

Right. And what if ret.error was 0, but ret.value was negative?

>>> +int sbi_remote_sfence_vma(cpumask_t *cpu_mask,
>>> +                          unsigned long start_addr,
>>> +                          unsigned long size)
>>> +{
>>> +    return __sbi_rfence(SBI_EXT_RFENCE_REMOTE_SFENCE_VMA,
>>> +                        cpu_mask, start_addr, size, 0, 0);
>>
>> No check (not even an assertion) here for __sbi_rfence still being
>> NULL?
> I thought that it would be enough to have BUG_ON() in sbi_init() but
> then probably would be better to update the message inside BUG_ON():
>    int __init sbi_init(void)
>    {
>    ....
>    
>        if ( !sbi_has_rfence() )
>        {
>            BUG_ON("At the moment flush_xen_tlb_range_va() uses SBI rfence
>    to "
>                   "flush TLB for all CPUS!");

I never really liked this kind of BUG_ON(). I leave it uncommented in
code which clearly is only temporary. Plus imo such BUG_ON()s want to
be next to where the risk is, i.e. in this case ahead of the possible
NULL deref. Then again, without PV guests and without anything mapped
at VA 0, you'll crash cleanly anyway. So perhaps my request to add a
check went too far.

Jan



 


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