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Re: [PATCH v11 2/5] xen/riscv: introduce decode_cause() stuff


  • To: oleksii.kurochko@xxxxxxxxx
  • From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Fri, 2 Aug 2024 08:04:54 +0200
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  • Cc: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@xxxxxxx>, xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Delivery-date: Fri, 02 Aug 2024 06:05:07 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>

On 01.08.2024 22:05, oleksii.kurochko@xxxxxxxxx wrote:
> On Thu, 2024-08-01 at 13:44 +0200, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> On 24.07.2024 17:31, Oleksii Kurochko wrote:
>>> The patch introduces stuff needed to decode a reason of an
>>> exception.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@xxxxxxxxx>
>>> Acked-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@xxxxxxx>
>>> Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
>>> ---
>>> Changes in V11:
>>>  - Nothing changed. Only rebase.
>>> ---
>>> Changes in V10:
>>>  - add Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
>>> ---
>>> Changes in V9:
>>>  - This patch was reverted as breaks both release and randconfig
>>> builds.
>>>    I don't see the failures now. ( probably it was because of
>>> printk usage
>>>    which was not ready at that moment ).
>>>  - drop inclusion of <asm/csr.h> and <asm/early_printk.h>
>>>  - add <asm/riscv_encoding.h> for CAUSE_* in decode_trap_cause().
>>> ---
>>> Changes in V8:
>>>   - fix typo in return string from decode_reserved_interrupt_cause
>>>   - add Acked-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@xxxxxxx>
>>> ---
>>> Changes in V7:
>>>  - Nothing changed. Only rebase.
>>> ---
>>> Changes in V6:
>>>  - Remove usage of LINK_TO_LOAD() due to the MMU being enabled
>>> first.
>>>  - Change early_printk() to printk()
>>> ---
>>> Changes in V5:
>>>   - Remove <xen/error.h> from riscv/traps/c as nothing would
>>> require
>>>     inclusion.
>>>   - decode_reserved_interrupt_cause(), decode_interrupt_cause(),
>>> decode_cause, do_unexpected_trap()
>>>     were made as static they are expected to be used only in
>>> traps.c
>>>   - use LINK_TO_LOAD() for addresses which can be linker time
>>> relative.
>>> ---
>>> Changes in V4:
>>>   - fix string in decode_reserved_interrupt_cause()
>>> ---
>>> Changes in V3:
>>>   - Nothing changed
>>> ---
>>> Changes in V2:
>>>   - Make decode_trap_cause() more optimization friendly.
>>>   - Merge the pathc which introduces do_unexpected_trap() to the
>>> current one.
>>> ---
>>>  xen/arch/riscv/traps.c | 80
>>> +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>>>  1 file changed, 79 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/xen/arch/riscv/traps.c b/xen/arch/riscv/traps.c
>>> index 5415cf8d90..37cec40dfa 100644
>>> --- a/xen/arch/riscv/traps.c
>>> +++ b/xen/arch/riscv/traps.c
>>> @@ -9,13 +9,91 @@
>>>  #include <xen/sched.h>
>>>  
>>>  #include <asm/processor.h>
>>> +#include <asm/riscv_encoding.h>
>>>  #include <asm/traps.h>
>>>  
>>> -void do_trap(struct cpu_user_regs *cpu_regs)
>>> +static const char *decode_trap_cause(unsigned long cause)
>>> +{
>>> +    static const char *const trap_causes[] = {
>>> +        [CAUSE_MISALIGNED_FETCH] = "Instruction Address
>>> Misaligned",
>>> +        [CAUSE_FETCH_ACCESS] = "Instruction Access Fault",
>>> +        [CAUSE_ILLEGAL_INSTRUCTION] = "Illegal Instruction",
>>> +        [CAUSE_BREAKPOINT] = "Breakpoint",
>>> +        [CAUSE_MISALIGNED_LOAD] = "Load Address Misaligned",
>>> +        [CAUSE_LOAD_ACCESS] = "Load Access Fault",
>>> +        [CAUSE_MISALIGNED_STORE] = "Store/AMO Address Misaligned",
>>> +        [CAUSE_STORE_ACCESS] = "Store/AMO Access Fault",
>>> +        [CAUSE_USER_ECALL] = "Environment Call from U-Mode",
>>> +        [CAUSE_SUPERVISOR_ECALL] = "Environment Call from S-Mode",
>>> +        [CAUSE_MACHINE_ECALL] = "Environment Call from M-Mode",
>>> +        [CAUSE_FETCH_PAGE_FAULT] = "Instruction Page Fault",
>>> +        [CAUSE_LOAD_PAGE_FAULT] = "Load Page Fault",
>>> +        [CAUSE_STORE_PAGE_FAULT] = "Store/AMO Page Fault",
>>> +        [CAUSE_FETCH_GUEST_PAGE_FAULT] = "Instruction Guest Page
>>> Fault",
>>> +        [CAUSE_LOAD_GUEST_PAGE_FAULT] = "Load Guest Page Fault",
>>> +        [CAUSE_VIRTUAL_INST_FAULT] = "Virtualized Instruction
>>> Fault",
>>> +        [CAUSE_STORE_GUEST_PAGE_FAULT] = "Guest Store/AMO Page
>>> Fault",
>>> +    };
>>> +
>>> +    if ( cause < ARRAY_SIZE(trap_causes) && trap_causes[cause] )
>>> +        return trap_causes[cause];
>>> +    return "UNKNOWN";
>>> +}
>>
>> While I committed this as-is, two more points: First, as soon any any
>> such array access becomes potentially reachable because of guest
>> activity, it wants to use array_access_nospec() or alike.
> Could you please explain why ( specifically ) guest activity affects if
> array access becomes potentially reachable? 

Anything the guest can affect wants to be as immune as possible towards
the guest trying to drive speculation the wrong way, and thus be able
to infer information from resulting internal state of the CPU. I'm sure
you're aware of at least the fact that there was a multitude of such
issues over the last several years.

Jan



 


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