[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [RFC XEN PATCH v9 5/5] domctl: Add XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission to grant gsi
Some type of domain don't have PIRQ, like PVH, it do not do PHYSDEVOP_map_pirq for each gsi. When passthrough a device to guest on PVH dom0, callstack pci_add_dm_done->XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission will failed at domain_pirq_to_irq, because PVH has no mapping of gsi, pirq and irq on Xen side. What's more, current hypercall XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission require passing in pirq and grant the access of irq, it is not suitable for dom0 that has no PIRQ flag, because passthrough a device needs gsi and grant the corresponding irq to guest. So, add a new hypercall to grant gsi permission when dom0 is not PV or dom0 has not PIRQ flag. Signed-off-by: Huang Rui <ray.huang@xxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Jiqian Chen <Jiqian.Chen@xxxxxxx> --- RFC: it needs review and needs to wait for the corresponding third patch on linux kernel side to be merged. --- tools/include/xenctrl.h | 5 +++ tools/libs/ctrl/xc_domain.c | 15 +++++++ tools/libs/light/libxl_pci.c | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++++------- xen/arch/x86/domctl.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++ xen/arch/x86/include/asm/io_apic.h | 2 + xen/arch/x86/io_apic.c | 21 +++++++++ xen/arch/x86/mpparse.c | 3 +- xen/include/public/domctl.h | 10 +++++ xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c | 1 + 9 files changed, 149 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/include/xenctrl.h b/tools/include/xenctrl.h index a0381f74d24b..f3feb6848e25 100644 --- a/tools/include/xenctrl.h +++ b/tools/include/xenctrl.h @@ -1382,6 +1382,11 @@ int xc_domain_irq_permission(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t pirq, bool allow_access); +int xc_domain_gsi_permission(xc_interface *xch, + uint32_t domid, + uint32_t gsi, + bool allow_access); + int xc_domain_iomem_permission(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domid, unsigned long first_mfn, diff --git a/tools/libs/ctrl/xc_domain.c b/tools/libs/ctrl/xc_domain.c index f2d9d14b4d9f..8540e84fda93 100644 --- a/tools/libs/ctrl/xc_domain.c +++ b/tools/libs/ctrl/xc_domain.c @@ -1394,6 +1394,21 @@ int xc_domain_irq_permission(xc_interface *xch, return do_domctl(xch, &domctl); } +int xc_domain_gsi_permission(xc_interface *xch, + uint32_t domid, + uint32_t gsi, + bool allow_access) +{ + struct xen_domctl domctl = { + .cmd = XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission, + .domain = domid, + .u.gsi_permission.gsi = gsi, + .u.gsi_permission.allow_access = allow_access, + }; + + return do_domctl(xch, &domctl); +} + int xc_domain_iomem_permission(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domid, unsigned long first_mfn, diff --git a/tools/libs/light/libxl_pci.c b/tools/libs/light/libxl_pci.c index 7e44d4c3ae2b..b8ec37d8d7e3 100644 --- a/tools/libs/light/libxl_pci.c +++ b/tools/libs/light/libxl_pci.c @@ -1412,6 +1412,37 @@ static bool pci_supp_legacy_irq(void) #define PCI_SBDF(seg, bus, devfn) \ ((((uint32_t)(seg)) << 16) | (PCI_DEVID(bus, devfn))) +static int pci_device_set_gsi(libxl_ctx *ctx, + libxl_domid domid, + libxl_device_pci *pci, + bool map, + int *gsi_back) +{ + int r, gsi, pirq; + uint32_t sbdf; + + sbdf = PCI_SBDF(pci->domain, pci->bus, (PCI_DEVFN(pci->dev, pci->func))); + r = xc_physdev_gsi_from_dev(ctx->xch, sbdf); + *gsi_back = r; + if (r < 0) + return r; + + gsi = r; + pirq = r; + if (map) + r = xc_physdev_map_pirq(ctx->xch, domid, gsi, &pirq); + else + r = xc_physdev_unmap_pirq(ctx->xch, domid, pirq); + if (r) + return r; + + r = xc_domain_gsi_permission(ctx->xch, domid, gsi, map); + if (r && errno == EOPNOTSUPP) + r = xc_domain_irq_permission(ctx->xch, domid, pirq, map); + + return r; +} + static void pci_add_dm_done(libxl__egc *egc, pci_add_state *pas, int rc) @@ -1424,10 +1455,10 @@ static void pci_add_dm_done(libxl__egc *egc, unsigned long long start, end, flags, size; int irq, i; int r; - uint32_t sbdf; uint32_t flag = XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_RDM_RELAXED; uint32_t domainid = domid; bool isstubdom = libxl_is_stubdom(ctx, domid, &domainid); + int gsi; /* Convenience aliases */ bool starting = pas->starting; @@ -1485,6 +1516,19 @@ static void pci_add_dm_done(libxl__egc *egc, fclose(f); if (!pci_supp_legacy_irq()) goto out_no_irq; + + r = pci_device_set_gsi(ctx, domid, pci, 1, &gsi); + if (gsi >= 0) { + if (r < 0) { + rc = ERROR_FAIL; + LOGED(ERROR, domainid, + "pci_device_set_gsi gsi=%d (error=%d)", gsi, errno); + goto out; + } else { + goto process_permissive; + } + } + /* if gsi < 0, keep using irq */ sysfs_path = GCSPRINTF(SYSFS_PCI_DEV"/"PCI_BDF"/irq", pci->domain, pci->bus, pci->dev, pci->func); f = fopen(sysfs_path, "r"); @@ -1493,13 +1537,6 @@ static void pci_add_dm_done(libxl__egc *egc, goto out_no_irq; } if ((fscanf(f, "%u", &irq) == 1) && irq) { - sbdf = PCI_SBDF(pci->domain, pci->bus, - (PCI_DEVFN(pci->dev, pci->func))); - r = xc_physdev_gsi_from_dev(ctx->xch, sbdf); - /* if fail, keep using irq; if success, r is gsi, use gsi */ - if (r != -1) { - irq = r; - } r = xc_physdev_map_pirq(ctx->xch, domid, irq, &irq); if (r < 0) { LOGED(ERROR, domainid, "xc_physdev_map_pirq irq=%d (error=%d)", @@ -1519,6 +1556,7 @@ static void pci_add_dm_done(libxl__egc *egc, } fclose(f); +process_permissive: /* Don't restrict writes to the PCI config space from this VM */ if (pci->permissive) { if ( sysfs_write_bdf(gc, SYSFS_PCIBACK_DRIVER"/permissive", @@ -2186,10 +2224,10 @@ static void pci_remove_detached(libxl__egc *egc, int irq = 0, i, stubdomid = 0; const char *sysfs_path; FILE *f; - uint32_t sbdf; uint32_t domainid = prs->domid; bool isstubdom; int r; + int gsi; /* Convenience aliases */ libxl_device_pci *const pci = &prs->pci; @@ -2245,6 +2283,15 @@ skip_bar: if (!pci_supp_legacy_irq()) goto skip_legacy_irq; + r = pci_device_set_gsi(ctx, domid, pci, 0, &gsi); + if (gsi >= 0) { + if (r < 0) { + LOGED(ERROR, domainid, + "pci_device_set_gsi gsi=%d (error=%d)", gsi, errno); + } + goto skip_legacy_irq; + } + /* if gsi < 0, keep using irq */ sysfs_path = GCSPRINTF(SYSFS_PCI_DEV"/"PCI_BDF"/irq", pci->domain, pci->bus, pci->dev, pci->func); @@ -2255,13 +2302,6 @@ skip_bar: } if ((fscanf(f, "%u", &irq) == 1) && irq) { - sbdf = PCI_SBDF(pci->domain, pci->bus, - (PCI_DEVFN(pci->dev, pci->func))); - r = xc_physdev_gsi_from_dev(ctx->xch, sbdf); - /* if fail, keep using irq; if success, r is gsi, use gsi */ - if (r != -1) { - irq = r; - } rc = xc_physdev_unmap_pirq(ctx->xch, domid, irq); if (rc < 0) { /* diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c index 9a72d57333e9..c69b4566ac4f 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ #include <asm/xstate.h> #include <asm/psr.h> #include <asm/cpu-policy.h> +#include <asm/io_apic.h> static int update_domain_cpu_policy(struct domain *d, xen_domctl_cpu_policy_t *xdpc) @@ -237,6 +238,43 @@ long arch_do_domctl( break; } + case XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission: + { + unsigned int gsi = domctl->u.gsi_permission.gsi; + int irq = gsi_2_irq(gsi); + bool allow = domctl->u.gsi_permission.allow_access; + + /* + * If current domain is PV or it has PIRQ flag, it has a mapping + * of gsi, pirq and irq, so it should use XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission + * to grant irq permission. + */ + if ( is_pv_domain(current->domain) || has_pirq(current->domain) ) + { + ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; + break; + } + + if ( gsi >= nr_irqs_gsi || irq < 0 ) + { + ret = -EINVAL; + break; + } + + if ( !irq_access_permitted(current->domain, irq) || + xsm_irq_permission(XSM_HOOK, d, irq, allow) ) + { + ret = -EPERM; + break; + } + + if ( allow ) + ret = irq_permit_access(d, irq); + else + ret = irq_deny_access(d, irq); + break; + } + case XEN_DOMCTL_getpageframeinfo3: { unsigned int num = domctl->u.getpageframeinfo3.num; diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/io_apic.h b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/io_apic.h index 78268ea8f666..7e86d8337758 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/io_apic.h +++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/io_apic.h @@ -213,5 +213,7 @@ unsigned highest_gsi(void); int ioapic_guest_read( unsigned long physbase, unsigned int reg, u32 *pval); int ioapic_guest_write(unsigned long physbase, unsigned int reg, u32 val); +int mp_find_ioapic(int gsi); +int gsi_2_irq(int gsi); #endif diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/io_apic.c b/xen/arch/x86/io_apic.c index b48a64246548..d03bcdef4d19 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/io_apic.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/io_apic.c @@ -955,6 +955,27 @@ static int pin_2_irq(int idx, int apic, int pin) return irq; } +int gsi_2_irq(int gsi) +{ + int entry, ioapic, pin; + + ioapic = mp_find_ioapic(gsi); + if ( ioapic < 0 ) + return -1; + + pin = gsi - io_apic_gsi_base(ioapic); + + entry = find_irq_entry(ioapic, pin, mp_INT); + /* + * If there is no override mapping for irq and gsi in mp_irqs, + * then the default identity mapping applies. + */ + if ( entry < 0 ) + return gsi; + + return pin_2_irq(entry, ioapic, pin); +} + static inline int IO_APIC_irq_trigger(int irq) { int apic, idx, pin; diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mpparse.c b/xen/arch/x86/mpparse.c index d8ccab2449c6..c95da0de5770 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/mpparse.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mpparse.c @@ -841,8 +841,7 @@ static struct mp_ioapic_routing { } mp_ioapic_routing[MAX_IO_APICS]; -static int mp_find_ioapic ( - int gsi) +int mp_find_ioapic(int gsi) { unsigned int i; diff --git a/xen/include/public/domctl.h b/xen/include/public/domctl.h index 2a49fe46ce25..f933af8722f4 100644 --- a/xen/include/public/domctl.h +++ b/xen/include/public/domctl.h @@ -465,6 +465,14 @@ struct xen_domctl_irq_permission { }; +/* XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission */ +struct xen_domctl_gsi_permission { + uint32_t gsi; + uint8_t allow_access; /* flag to specify enable/disable of x86 gsi access */ + uint8_t pad[3]; +}; + + /* XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission */ struct xen_domctl_iomem_permission { uint64_aligned_t first_mfn;/* first page (physical page number) in range */ @@ -1306,6 +1314,7 @@ struct xen_domctl { #define XEN_DOMCTL_get_paging_mempool_size 85 #define XEN_DOMCTL_set_paging_mempool_size 86 #define XEN_DOMCTL_dt_overlay 87 +#define XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission 88 #define XEN_DOMCTL_gdbsx_guestmemio 1000 #define XEN_DOMCTL_gdbsx_pausevcpu 1001 #define XEN_DOMCTL_gdbsx_unpausevcpu 1002 @@ -1328,6 +1337,7 @@ struct xen_domctl { struct xen_domctl_setdomainhandle setdomainhandle; struct xen_domctl_setdebugging setdebugging; struct xen_domctl_irq_permission irq_permission; + struct xen_domctl_gsi_permission gsi_permission; struct xen_domctl_iomem_permission iomem_permission; struct xen_domctl_ioport_permission ioport_permission; struct xen_domctl_hypercall_init hypercall_init; diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c index 5e88c71b8e22..a5b134c91101 100644 --- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c +++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c @@ -685,6 +685,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct domain *d, int cmd) case XEN_DOMCTL_shadow_op: case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission: case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping: + case XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission: #endif #ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH /* -- 2.34.1
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