[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [XEN PATCH v2 2/9] x86/cpuid: address violation of MISRA C Rule 16.2
Refactor the switch so that a violation of MISRA C Rule 16.2 is resolved (A switch label shall only be used when the most closely-enclosing compound statement is the body of a switch statement). Note that the switch clause ending with the pseudo keyword "fallthrough" is an allowed exception to Rule 16.3. No functional change. Signed-off-by: Nicola Vetrini <nicola.vetrini@xxxxxxxxxxx> --- xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c | 31 +++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c index 7290a979c667..0a7c55199f94 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c @@ -331,23 +331,22 @@ void guest_cpuid(const struct vcpu *v, uint32_t leaf, switch ( subleaf ) { case 1: - if ( p->xstate.xsavec || p->xstate.xsaves ) - { - /* - * TODO: Figure out what to do for XSS state. VT-x manages - * host vs guest MSR_XSS automatically, so as soon as we start - * supporting any XSS states, the wrong XSS will be in - * context. - */ - BUILD_BUG_ON(XSTATE_XSAVES_ONLY != 0); - - /* - * Read CPUID[0xD,0/1].EBX from hardware. They vary with - * enabled XSTATE, and appropraite XCR0|XSS are in context. - */ + if ( !(p->xstate.xsavec || p->xstate.xsaves) ) + break; + /* + * TODO: Figure out what to do for XSS state. VT-x manages + * host vs guest MSR_XSS automatically, so as soon as we start + * supporting any XSS states, the wrong XSS will be in + * context. + */ + BUILD_BUG_ON(XSTATE_XSAVES_ONLY != 0); + fallthrough; case 0: - res->b = cpuid_count_ebx(leaf, subleaf); - } + /* + * Read CPUID[0xD,0/1].EBX from hardware. They vary with + * enabled XSTATE, and appropriate XCR0|XSS are in context. + */ + res->b = cpuid_count_ebx(leaf, subleaf); break; } break; -- 2.34.1
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