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Re: [PATCH v4 07/30] xen/asm-generic: introdure nospec.h


  • To: Oleksii <oleksii.kurochko@xxxxxxxxx>
  • From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Wed, 21 Feb 2024 12:00:38 +0100
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  • Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>, Bertrand Marquis <bertrand.marquis@xxxxxxx>, Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@xxxxxxx>, Volodymyr Babchuk <Volodymyr_Babchuk@xxxxxxxx>, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>, George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx>, Wei Liu <wl@xxxxxxx>, Shawn Anastasio <sanastasio@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@xxxxxxx>, Bob Eshleman <bobbyeshleman@xxxxxxxxx>, Connor Davis <connojdavis@xxxxxxxxx>, Julien Grall <julien@xxxxxxx>, xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Delivery-date: Wed, 21 Feb 2024 11:00:48 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>

On 20.02.2024 21:30, Oleksii wrote:
> On Mon, 2024-02-19 at 13:18 +0100, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> On 19.02.2024 12:59, Oleksii wrote:
>>> Hi Julien,
>>>
>>> On Sun, 2024-02-18 at 18:30 +0000, Julien Grall wrote:
>>>> Hi Oleksii,
>>>>
>>>> Title: Typo s/introdure/introduce/
>>>>
>>>> On 05/02/2024 15:32, Oleksii Kurochko wrote:
>>>>> The <asm/nospec.h> header is similar between Arm, PPC, and
>>>>> RISC-V,
>>>>> so it has been moved to asm-generic.
>>>>
>>>> I am not 100% convinced that moving this header to asm-generic is
>>>> a
>>>> good 
>>>> idea. At least for Arm, those helpers ought to be non-empty, what
>>>> about 
>>>> RISC-V?
>>> For Arm, they are not taking any action, are they? There are no
>>> specific fences or other mechanisms inside
>>> evaluate_nospec()/block_speculation() to address speculation.
>>
>> The question isn't the status quo, but how things should be looking
>> like
>> if everything was in place that's (in principle) needed.
>>
>>> For RISC-V, it can be implemented in a similar manner, at least for
>>> now. Since these functions are only used in the grant tables code (
>>> for
>>> Arm and so for RISC-V ), which is not supported by RISC-V.
>>
>> Same here - the question is whether long term, when gnttab is also
>> supported, RISC-V would get away without doing anything. Still ...
>>
>>>> If the answer is they should be non-empty. Then I would consider
>>>> to
>>>> keep 
>>>> the duplication to make clear that each architecture should take
>>>> their 
>>>> own decision in term of security.
>>>>
>>>> The alternative, is to have a generic implementation that is safe
>>>> by 
>>>> default (if that's even possible).
>>> I am not certain that we can have a generic implementation, as each
>>> architecture may have specific speculation issues.
>>
>> ... it's theoretically possible that there'd be an arch with no
>> speculation issues, maybe simply because of not speculating.
> 
> I am not sure that understand your and Julien point.
> 
> For example, modern CPU uses speculative execution to reduce the cost
> of conditional branch instructions using schemes that predict the
> execution path of a program based on the history of branch executions.
> 
> Arm CPUs are vulnerable for speculative execution, but if to look at
> the code of evaluate_nospec()/block_speculation() functions they are
> doing nothing for Arm.

Which, as I understood Julien say, likely isn't correct. In which case
this header shouldn't be dropped, using the generic one instead. The
generic headers, as pointed out several times before, should imo be used
only if their use results in correct behavior. What is acceptable is if
their use results in sub-optimal behavior (e.g. reduced performance or
lack of a certain feature that another architecture maybe implements).

Jan



 


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