[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [RFC XEN PATCH v4 4/5] domctl: Use gsi to grant/revoke irq permission
On 09.01.2024 09:18, Chen, Jiqian wrote: > On 2024/1/8 23:05, Roger Pau Monné wrote: >> On Mon, Jan 08, 2024 at 09:55:26AM +0100, Jan Beulich wrote: >>> On 06.01.2024 02:08, Stefano Stabellini wrote: >>>> On Fri, 5 Jan 2024, Jiqian Chen wrote: >>>>> --- a/tools/libs/light/libxl_pci.c >>>>> +++ b/tools/libs/light/libxl_pci.c >>>>> @@ -1418,6 +1418,7 @@ static void pci_add_dm_done(libxl__egc *egc, >>>>> unsigned long long start, end, flags, size; >>>>> int irq, i; >>>>> int r; >>>>> + int gsi; >>>>> uint32_t flag = XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_RDM_RELAXED; >>>>> uint32_t domainid = domid; >>>>> bool isstubdom = libxl_is_stubdom(ctx, domid, &domainid); >>>>> @@ -1486,6 +1487,7 @@ static void pci_add_dm_done(libxl__egc *egc, >>>>> goto out_no_irq; >>>>> } >>>>> if ((fscanf(f, "%u", &irq) == 1) && irq) { >>>>> + gsi = irq; >>>> >>>> A question for Roger and Jan: are we always guaranteed that gsi == irq >>>> (also in the PV case)? >>> >>> Iirc for IO-APIC based IRQs that's always the case; >> >> I think that's always the case on Linux, because it calls >> PHYSDEVOP_map_pirq with index == pirq (see Linux >> pci_xen_initial_domain()). But other OSes could possibly make the >> call with pirq == -1 and get a randomly allocated pirq for GSIs. > I don't think it's important whether pirq is randomly generated. What's > important is whether irq always equals gsi in xen. > If so, we can directly pass in and grant gsi. However, according to Jan's > previous email reply, in the case of Msi, irq may not be equal to gsi, so my > patch cannot meet this situation. > I am confusing if the current domain doesn't have PIRQ flag, then regarding > to XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission, which kind of irq we should grant to caller > domain? The gsi or other irq? > Or can we add a check in XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission, if the current domain has > PRIQ, we can get irq from pirq(like the original implementation), if not we > can assign gsi to irq, and then grant irq. Of course, that needs to require > the caller to pass in both the pirq and gsi. I expect MSI will need handling differently from GSIs. When MSI is set up for a device (and hence for a domain in possession of that device), access ought to be granted right away. >> IOW: I don't think the pirq field in xen_domctl_irq_permission can be >> altered like proposed here to switch from passing a pirq to a GSI. A >> new hypercall should be introduced that either is GSI specific, or >> contains a type field in order to specify the namespace the field >> targets. > A new hypercall using for granting gsi? If so, how does the caller know to > call which hypercall to grant permission, XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission or that > new hypercall? Either we add a feature indicator, or the caller simply tries the new GSI interface first. > I mean how the caller know if the current domain has PIRQ or not and when to > pass in pirq number, when to pass in gsi number. An interface that's GSI-centric would only ever be passed a GSI (of course, I'm inclined to add). Jan
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