[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [PATCH v2 3/6] x86/iommu: introduce a rangeset to perform hwdom IOMMU setup
This change just introduces the boilerplate code in order to use a rangeset when setting up the hardware domain IOMMU mappings. The rangeset is never populated in this patch, so it's a non-functional change as far as the mappings the domain gets established. Note there's a change for HVM domains (ie: PVH dom0) that will get switched to create the p2m mappings using map_mmio_regions() instead of p2m_add_identity_entry(), so that ranges can be mapped with a single function call if possible. Note that the interface of map_mmio_regions() doesn't allow creating read-only mappings, but so far there are no such mappings created for PVH dom0 in arch_iommu_hwdom_init(). Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> --- Changes since v1: - Split from bigger patch. --- xen/drivers/passthrough/x86/iommu.c | 89 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 89 insertions(+) diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/x86/iommu.c b/xen/drivers/passthrough/x86/iommu.c index 857dccb6a465..531a428f6496 100644 --- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/x86/iommu.c +++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/x86/iommu.c @@ -370,10 +370,77 @@ static unsigned int __hwdom_init hwdom_iommu_map(const struct domain *d, return perms; } +struct map_data { + struct domain *d; + unsigned int flush_flags; + bool ro; +}; + +static int __hwdom_init cf_check identity_map(unsigned long s, unsigned long e, + void *data) +{ + struct map_data *info = data; + struct domain *d = info->d; + long rc; + + if ( iommu_verbose ) + printk(XENLOG_INFO " [%010lx, %010lx] R%c\n", + s, e, info->ro ? 'O' : 'W'); + + if ( paging_mode_translate(d) ) + { + if ( info->ro ) + { + ASSERT_UNREACHABLE(); + return 0; + } + while ( (rc = map_mmio_regions(d, _gfn(s), e - s + 1, _mfn(s))) > 0 ) + { + s += rc; + process_pending_softirqs(); + } + } + else + { + const unsigned int perms = IOMMUF_readable | IOMMUF_preempt | + (info->ro ? 0 : IOMMUF_writable); + + if ( info->ro && !iomem_access_permitted(d, s, e) ) + { + /* + * Should be more fine grained in order to not map the forbidden + * frame instead of rejecting the region as a whole, but it's only + * for read-only MMIO regions, which are very limited. + */ + printk(XENLOG_DEBUG + "IOMMU read-only mapping of region [%lx, %lx] forbidden\n", + s, e); + return 0; + } + while ( (rc = iommu_map(d, _dfn(s), _mfn(s), e - s + 1, + perms, &info->flush_flags)) > 0 ) + { + s += rc; + process_pending_softirqs(); + } + } + ASSERT(rc <= 0); + if ( rc ) + printk(XENLOG_WARNING + "IOMMU identity mapping of [%lx, %lx] failed: %ld\n", + s, e, rc); + + /* Ignore errors and attempt to map the remaining regions. */ + return 0; +} + void __hwdom_init arch_iommu_hwdom_init(struct domain *d) { unsigned long i, top, max_pfn, start, count; unsigned int flush_flags = 0, start_perms = 0; + struct rangeset *map; + struct map_data map_data = { .d = d }; + int rc; BUG_ON(!is_hardware_domain(d)); @@ -397,6 +464,10 @@ void __hwdom_init arch_iommu_hwdom_init(struct domain *d) if ( iommu_hwdom_passthrough ) return; + map = rangeset_new(NULL, NULL, 0); + if ( !map ) + panic("IOMMU init: unable to allocate rangeset\n"); + max_pfn = (GB(4) >> PAGE_SHIFT) - 1; top = max(max_pdx, pfn_to_pdx(max_pfn) + 1); @@ -451,6 +522,24 @@ void __hwdom_init arch_iommu_hwdom_init(struct domain *d) goto commit; } + if ( iommu_verbose ) + printk(XENLOG_INFO "d%u: identity mappings for IOMMU:\n", + d->domain_id); + + rc = rangeset_report_ranges(map, 0, ~0UL, identity_map, &map_data); + if ( rc ) + panic("IOMMU unable to create mappings: %d\n", rc); + if ( is_pv_domain(d) ) + { + map_data.ro = true; + rc = rangeset_report_ranges(mmio_ro_ranges, 0, ~0UL, identity_map, + &map_data); + if ( rc ) + panic("IOMMU unable to create read-only mappings: %d\n", rc); + } + + rangeset_destroy(map); + /* Use if to avoid compiler warning */ if ( iommu_iotlb_flush_all(d, flush_flags) ) return; -- 2.43.0
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