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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [PATCH v2 3/6] x86/iommu: introduce a rangeset to perform hwdom IOMMU setup
This change just introduces the boilerplate code in order to use a rangeset
when setting up the hardware domain IOMMU mappings. The rangeset is never
populated in this patch, so it's a non-functional change as far as the mappings
the domain gets established.
Note there's a change for HVM domains (ie: PVH dom0) that will get switched to
create the p2m mappings using map_mmio_regions() instead of
p2m_add_identity_entry(), so that ranges can be mapped with a single function
call if possible. Note that the interface of map_mmio_regions() doesn't allow
creating read-only mappings, but so far there are no such mappings created for
PVH dom0 in arch_iommu_hwdom_init().
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
Changes since v1:
- Split from bigger patch.
---
xen/drivers/passthrough/x86/iommu.c | 89 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 89 insertions(+)
diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/x86/iommu.c
b/xen/drivers/passthrough/x86/iommu.c
index 857dccb6a465..531a428f6496 100644
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/x86/iommu.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/x86/iommu.c
@@ -370,10 +370,77 @@ static unsigned int __hwdom_init hwdom_iommu_map(const
struct domain *d,
return perms;
}
+struct map_data {
+ struct domain *d;
+ unsigned int flush_flags;
+ bool ro;
+};
+
+static int __hwdom_init cf_check identity_map(unsigned long s, unsigned long e,
+ void *data)
+{
+ struct map_data *info = data;
+ struct domain *d = info->d;
+ long rc;
+
+ if ( iommu_verbose )
+ printk(XENLOG_INFO " [%010lx, %010lx] R%c\n",
+ s, e, info->ro ? 'O' : 'W');
+
+ if ( paging_mode_translate(d) )
+ {
+ if ( info->ro )
+ {
+ ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+ return 0;
+ }
+ while ( (rc = map_mmio_regions(d, _gfn(s), e - s + 1, _mfn(s))) > 0 )
+ {
+ s += rc;
+ process_pending_softirqs();
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ const unsigned int perms = IOMMUF_readable | IOMMUF_preempt |
+ (info->ro ? 0 : IOMMUF_writable);
+
+ if ( info->ro && !iomem_access_permitted(d, s, e) )
+ {
+ /*
+ * Should be more fine grained in order to not map the forbidden
+ * frame instead of rejecting the region as a whole, but it's only
+ * for read-only MMIO regions, which are very limited.
+ */
+ printk(XENLOG_DEBUG
+ "IOMMU read-only mapping of region [%lx, %lx] forbidden\n",
+ s, e);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ while ( (rc = iommu_map(d, _dfn(s), _mfn(s), e - s + 1,
+ perms, &info->flush_flags)) > 0 )
+ {
+ s += rc;
+ process_pending_softirqs();
+ }
+ }
+ ASSERT(rc <= 0);
+ if ( rc )
+ printk(XENLOG_WARNING
+ "IOMMU identity mapping of [%lx, %lx] failed: %ld\n",
+ s, e, rc);
+
+ /* Ignore errors and attempt to map the remaining regions. */
+ return 0;
+}
+
void __hwdom_init arch_iommu_hwdom_init(struct domain *d)
{
unsigned long i, top, max_pfn, start, count;
unsigned int flush_flags = 0, start_perms = 0;
+ struct rangeset *map;
+ struct map_data map_data = { .d = d };
+ int rc;
BUG_ON(!is_hardware_domain(d));
@@ -397,6 +464,10 @@ void __hwdom_init arch_iommu_hwdom_init(struct domain *d)
if ( iommu_hwdom_passthrough )
return;
+ map = rangeset_new(NULL, NULL, 0);
+ if ( !map )
+ panic("IOMMU init: unable to allocate rangeset\n");
+
max_pfn = (GB(4) >> PAGE_SHIFT) - 1;
top = max(max_pdx, pfn_to_pdx(max_pfn) + 1);
@@ -451,6 +522,24 @@ void __hwdom_init arch_iommu_hwdom_init(struct domain *d)
goto commit;
}
+ if ( iommu_verbose )
+ printk(XENLOG_INFO "d%u: identity mappings for IOMMU:\n",
+ d->domain_id);
+
+ rc = rangeset_report_ranges(map, 0, ~0UL, identity_map, &map_data);
+ if ( rc )
+ panic("IOMMU unable to create mappings: %d\n", rc);
+ if ( is_pv_domain(d) )
+ {
+ map_data.ro = true;
+ rc = rangeset_report_ranges(mmio_ro_ranges, 0, ~0UL, identity_map,
+ &map_data);
+ if ( rc )
+ panic("IOMMU unable to create read-only mappings: %d\n", rc);
+ }
+
+ rangeset_destroy(map);
+
/* Use if to avoid compiler warning */
if ( iommu_iotlb_flush_all(d, flush_flags) )
return;
--
2.43.0
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