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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH v8 02/13] vpci: use per-domain PCI lock to protect vpci structure
On Fri, Jul 28, 2023 at 12:21:54AM +0000, Volodymyr Babchuk wrote:
>
> Hi Roger,
>
> Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> writes:
>
> > On Thu, Jul 27, 2023 at 12:56:54AM +0000, Volodymyr Babchuk wrote:
> >> Hi Roger,
> >>
> >> Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> writes:
> >>
> >> > On Wed, Jul 26, 2023 at 01:17:58AM +0000, Volodymyr Babchuk wrote:
> >> >>
> >> >> Hi Roger,
> >> >>
> >> >> Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> writes:
> >> >>
> >> >> > On Thu, Jul 20, 2023 at 12:32:31AM +0000, Volodymyr Babchuk wrote:
> >> >> >> From: Oleksandr Andrushchenko <oleksandr_andrushchenko@xxxxxxxx>
> >> >> >> @@ -498,6 +537,7 @@ void vpci_write(pci_sbdf_t sbdf, unsigned int
> >> >> >> reg, unsigned int size,
> >> >> >> ASSERT(data_offset < size);
> >> >> >> }
> >> >> >> spin_unlock(&pdev->vpci->lock);
> >> >> >> + unlock_locks(d);
> >> >> >
> >> >> > There's one issue here, some handlers will cal pcidevs_lock(), which
> >> >> > will result in a lock over inversion, as in the previous patch we
> >> >> > agreed that the locking order was pcidevs_lock first, d->pci_lock
> >> >> > after.
> >> >> >
> >> >> > For example the MSI control_write() handler will call
> >> >> > vpci_msi_arch_enable() which takes the pcidevs lock. I think I will
> >> >> > have to look into using a dedicated lock for MSI related handling, as
> >> >> > that's the only place where I think we have this pattern of taking the
> >> >> > pcidevs_lock after the d->pci_lock.
> >> >>
> >> >> I'll mention this in the commit message. Is there something else that I
> >> >> should do right now?
> >> >
> >> > Well, I don't think we want to commit this as-is with a known lock
> >> > inversion.
> >> >
> >> > The functions that require the pcidevs lock are:
> >> >
> >> > pt_irq_{create,destroy}_bind()
> >> > unmap_domain_pirq()
> >> >
> >> > AFAICT those functions require the lock in order to assert that the
> >> > underlying device doesn't go away, as they do also use d->event_lock
> >> > in order to get exclusive access to the data fields. Please double
> >> > check that I'm not mistaken.
> >>
> >> You are right, all three function does not access any of PCI state
> >> directly. However...
> >>
> >> > If that's accurate you will have to check the call tree that spawns
> >> > from those functions in order to modify the asserts to check for
> >> > either the pcidevs or the per-domain pci_list lock being taken.
> >>
> >> ... I checked calls for PT_IRQ_TYPE_MSI case, there is only call that
> >> bothers me: hvm_pi_update_irte(), which calls IO-MMU code via
> >> vmx_pi_update_irte():
> >>
> >> amd_iommu_msi_msg_update_ire() or msi_msg_write_remap_rte().
> >
> > That path is only for VT-d, so strictly speaking you only need to worry
> > about msi_msg_write_remap_rte().
> >
> > msi_msg_write_remap_rte() does take the IOMMU intremap lock.
> >
> > There are also existing callers of iommu_update_ire_from_msi() that
> > call the functions without the pcidevs locked. See
> > hpet_msi_set_affinity() for example.
>
> Thank you for clarifying this.
>
> I have found another call path which causes troubles:
> __pci_enable_msi[x] is called from pci_enable_msi() via vMSI, via
> physdev_map_irq and also directly from ns16550 driver.
Both vPCI and physdev_map_irq() use the same path: map_domain_pirq()
which gets called with d->event_lock taken in exclusive mode, that
should be enough as a device cannot be assigned to multiple guests.
ns16550_init_postirq() is an init function, which means it won't be
executed after Xen has booted, so I think this is all fine, as
concurrent accesses from ns16550_init_postirq() and map_domain_pirq()
are impossible.
Thanks, Roger.
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