Re: [PATCH] x86/vmx: Revert "x86/VMX: sanitize rIP before re-entering guest"

[Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>]

On 05.04.2023 23:52, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> At the time of XSA-170, the x86 instruction emulator was genuinely broken.  It
> would load arbitrary values into %rip and putting a check here probably was
> the best stopgap security fix.  It should have been reverted following c/s
> 81d3a0b26c1 "x86emul: limit-check branch targets" which corrected the emulator
> behaviour.
> 
> However, everyone involved in XSA-170, myself included, failed to read the SDM
> correctly.  On the subject of %rip consistency checks, the SDM stated:
> 
>   If the processor supports N < 64 linear-address bits, bits 63:N must be
>   identical
> 
> A non-canonical %rip (and SSP more recently) is an explicitly legal state in
> x86, and the VMEntry consistency checks are intentionally off-by-one from a
> regular canonical check.
> 
> The consequence of this bug is that Xen will currently take a legal x86 state
> which would successfully VMEnter, and corrupt it into having non-architectural
> behaviour.
> 
> Furthermore, in the time this bugfix has been pending in public, I
> successfully persuaded Intel to clarify the SDM, adding the following
> clarification:
> 
>   The guest RIP value is not required to be canonical; the value of bit N-1
>   may differ from that of bit N.
> 
> Fixes: ffbbfda377 ("x86/VMX: sanitize rIP before re-entering guest")
> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>

I am kind of okay with such a full revert, but I'd consider it quite helpful
if the description made clear why the alternative of instead doing the spec
mandated check isn't necessary / useful. The emulator having gained respective
checking is only part of the reason for this, aiui. Plus bugs may be
introduced into the emulator again, where the checking here could be a guard
against needing to issue an XSA in such a case.

Jan