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Re: [RFC 03/10] x86/p2m: guard vmx specific ept functions with INTEL_VMX


  • To: Xenia Ragiadakou <burzalodowa@xxxxxxxxx>
  • From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2023 17:55:41 +0100
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  • Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>, George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx>, Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>, Wei Liu <wl@xxxxxxx>, xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Delivery-date: Mon, 13 Feb 2023 16:56:29 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>

On 13.02.2023 15:57, Xenia Ragiadakou wrote:
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.h
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.h
> @@ -35,9 +35,25 @@ void p2m_nestedp2m_init(struct p2m_domain *p2m);
>  int p2m_init_nestedp2m(struct domain *d);
>  void p2m_teardown_nestedp2m(struct domain *d);
>  
> +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_VMX
>  int ept_p2m_init(struct p2m_domain *p2m);
>  void ept_p2m_uninit(struct p2m_domain *p2m);

For the calls from p2m_initialise() and p2m_free_one() see my reply
to patch 2. For the calls from altp2m functions, including ...

>  void p2m_init_altp2m_ept(struct domain *d, unsigned int i);

... to this one, I think you want to be more rigorous and hide much
(most?) of altp2m altogether when !VMX. (It is perhaps high time
for more of that code to move from p2m.c to altp2m.c, and altp2m.c
then, if it doesn't already, to become dependent on VMX somewhere
in the Makefile in your series.)

Jan



 


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