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Re: [PATCH] Validate EFI memory descriptors
- To: Demi Marie Obenour <demi@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
- Date: Thu, 8 Dec 2022 11:16:38 +0100
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- Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>, George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx>, Julien Grall <julien@xxxxxxx>, Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>, Wei Liu <wl@xxxxxxx>, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>, xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Delivery-date: Thu, 08 Dec 2022 10:16:47 +0000
- List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>
On 08.12.2022 10:36, Demi Marie Obenour wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 08, 2022 at 09:02:57AM +0100, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> Tainting the hypervisor in the event of finding an issue is certainly
>> an option.
>
> I probably will not add such a mechanism, but if one exists I would be
> happy to use it.
See common/kernel.c:add_taint(). What you would need to introduce is a
new TAINT_* constant (and its associated handling), unless we wanted to
reuse (abuse) an existing one (yet none looks to even come just close).
Jan
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