[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH for-4.17 v2.1 2/3] amd/virt_ssbd: set SSBD at vCPU context switch
On 02.11.2022 18:38, Roger Pau Monné wrote: > On Wed, Nov 02, 2022 at 12:49:17PM +0100, Jan Beulich wrote: >> On 29.10.2022 15:12, Roger Pau Monne wrote: >>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c >>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c >>> @@ -973,6 +973,16 @@ static void cf_check svm_ctxt_switch_from(struct vcpu >>> *v) >>> >>> /* Resume use of ISTs now that the host TR is reinstated. */ >>> enable_each_ist(idt_tables[cpu]); >>> + >>> + /* >>> + * Clear previous guest selection of SSBD if set. Note that >>> SPEC_CTRL.SSBD >>> + * is already cleared by svm_vmexit_spec_ctrl. >>> + */ >>> + if ( v->arch.msrs->virt_spec_ctrl.raw & SPEC_CTRL_SSBD ) >>> + { >>> + ASSERT(v->domain->arch.cpuid->extd.virt_ssbd); >>> + amd_set_ssbd(false); >>> + } >>> } >> >> Aren't you potentially turning off SSBD here just to ... >> >>> @@ -1000,6 +1010,13 @@ static void cf_check svm_ctxt_switch_to(struct vcpu >>> *v) >>> >>> if ( cpu_has_msr_tsc_aux ) >>> wrmsr_tsc_aux(v->arch.msrs->tsc_aux); >>> + >>> + /* Load SSBD if set by the guest. */ >>> + if ( v->arch.msrs->virt_spec_ctrl.raw & SPEC_CTRL_SSBD ) >>> + { >>> + ASSERT(v->domain->arch.cpuid->extd.virt_ssbd); >>> + amd_set_ssbd(true); >>> + } >>> } >> >> ... turn it on here again? IOW wouldn't switching better be isolated to >> just svm_ctxt_switch_to(), doing nothing if already in the intended mode? > > What if we switch from a HVM vCPU into a PV one? AFAICT then > svm_ctxt_switch_to() won't get called and we would be running the PV > guest with the previous HVM domain SSBD selection. Would that be a problem? Or in other words: What is the intended behavior for PV? PV domains can control SSBD via SPEC_CTRL (only), so all we need to guarantee is that we respect their choice there. >>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/msr.c >>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/msr.c >>> @@ -697,7 +697,15 @@ int guest_wrmsr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t >>> val) >>> msrs->spec_ctrl.raw &= ~SPEC_CTRL_SSBD; >>> } >>> else >>> + { >>> msrs->virt_spec_ctrl.raw = val & SPEC_CTRL_SSBD; >>> + if ( v == curr ) >>> + /* >>> + * Propagate the value to hardware, as it won't be context >>> + * switched on vmentry. >>> + */ >> >> I have to admit that I find "on vmentry" in the comment misleading: Reading >> it I first thought you're still alluding to the old model. Plus I also find >> the combination of "context switched" and "on vmentry" problematic, as we >> generally mean something else when we say "context switch". > > I had a hard time wording this, because of the Xen/guest vs vCPU > context switches. > > What about: > > "Propagate the value to hardware, as it won't we set on guest resume > path." Sounds better, thanks (with s/we/be/). >>> + goto set_reg; >> >> It's not clear why you want to use hvm_set_reg() in the first place - the >> comment says "propagate to hardware", which would mean wrmsrl() in the >> usual case. Here it would mean a direct call to amd_set_ssbd() imo. That >> would then also be in line with all other "v == curr" conditionals, none >> of which apply to any "goto set_reg". ..._set_reg(), aiui, is meant only >> for use in cases where vCPU state needs updating such that proper state >> would be loaded later (e.g. during VM entry). > > I thought it was better to hide those vendor specific calls in the > already existing vendor hooks (set_reg). I don't mind calling > amd_set_ssbd() directly here if that's preferred, it seemed kind of a > layering violation when we have vendor specific hooks in place. Well, Andrew of course should correct me if I'm wrong, but my understanding of the get/set-reg interface is as described. On which grounds I don't see any layering violation here - doing the call right here is merely a more involved flavor of wrmsrl(). Jan
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