[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] xen/pv: allow pmu msr accesses to cause GP
On 04.10.2022 10:43, Juergen Gross wrote: > Today pmu_msr_read() and pmu_msr_write() fall back to the safe variants > of read/write MSR in case the MSR access isn't emulated via Xen. Allow > the caller to select the potentially faulting variant by passing NULL > for the error pointer. > > Restructure the code to make it more readable. > > Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx> I think the title (and to some degree also the description) is misleading: The property we care about here isn't whether an MSR access would raise #GP (we can't control that), but whether that #GP would be recovered from. > --- a/arch/x86/xen/pmu.c > +++ b/arch/x86/xen/pmu.c > @@ -131,6 +131,9 @@ static inline uint32_t get_fam15h_addr(u32 addr) > > static inline bool is_amd_pmu_msr(unsigned int msr) > { > + if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL) > + return false; I understand this and ... > @@ -144,6 +147,9 @@ static int is_intel_pmu_msr(u32 msr_index, int *type, int > *index) > { > u32 msr_index_pmc; > > + if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL) > + return false; ... this matches prior behavior, but may I suggest that while moving these here you at least accompany them by a comment clarifying that these aren't really correct? We'd come closer if is_amd_pmu_msr() accepted AMD and Hygon, while is_intel_pmu_msr() may want to accept Intel and Centaur (but I understand this would be largely orthogonal, hence the suggestion towards comments). In the hypervisor we kind of also support Shanghai, but I wonder whether we wouldn't better rip out that code as unmaintained. Jan
|
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |