Re: Setting constant-time mode CPU flag

[Demi Marie Obenour <demi@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

On Wed, Sep 14, 2022 at 08:44:25AM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote:
> On 14.09.2022 08:40, Demi Marie Obenour wrote:
> > On Wed, Sep 14, 2022 at 08:36:02AM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote:
> >> On 13.09.2022 19:22, Demi Marie Obenour wrote:
> >>> On Tue, Sep 13, 2022 at 04:47:24PM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote:
> >>>> On 13.09.2022 16:22, Demi Marie Obenour wrote:
> >>>>> On Tue, Sep 06, 2022 at 10:01:00AM +0000, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> >>>>>> On 06/09/2022 10:52, Jan Beulich wrote:
> >>>>>>> On 02.09.2022 04:05, Demi Marie Obenour wrote:
> >>>>>>>> On Intel chips (Ice Lake and later) and ARM64, a bit needs to be set 
> >>>>>>>> in
> >>>>>>>> a CPU register to enforce constant-time execution.  Linux plans to 
> >>>>>>>> set
> >>>>>>>> this bit by default; Xen should do the same.  See
> >>>>>>>> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YwgCrqutxmX0W72r@xxxxxxxxx/T/ for 
> >>>>>>>> details.
> >>>>>>>> I recommend setting the bit unconditionally and ignoring guest 
> >>>>>>>> attempts
> >>>>>>>> to change it.
> >>>>>>> I don't think we ought to set it by default; I can see reasons why 
> >>>>>>> kernels
> >>>>>>> may want to set it by default (providing a way to turn it off). In Xen
> >>>>>>> what I think we need is exposure of the bit to be guest-controllable.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> We absolutely should not have it set by default.  It's a substantial
> >>>>>> overhead for something that is only applicable to code which otherwise
> >>>>>> crafted to be constant-time.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Either Xen needs to set the bit by default, or guests need to both know
> >>>>> the bit needs to be set and be able set it.  Otherwise code that *is*
> >>>>> intended to be constant-time has no way to protect itself.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> As for why Xen doesn't enumerate/virtualise it, that's because
> >>>>>> virtualising MSR_ARCH_CAPS for guests is still not working yet, so the
> >>>>>> feature can't be enumerated yet even if we did support context 
> >>>>>> switching it.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Intel and ARM64 guarantee that CPUs that do not enumerate this flag
> >>>>> behave as if it is set unconditionally.
> >>>>
> >>>> I'm not qualified to talk about the Arm side, but may I ask what you've
> >>>> derived this statement from for Intel? The doc page referenced by the
> >>>> link you did provide (still in context above) specifically further links
> >>>> to a page listing instruction with data operand independent timing. All
> >>>> other instructions, as I conclude, have variable timing unless the bit
> >>>> in ARCH_CAPS enumerates DOITM and then the new MSR bit (of the same name)
> >>>> is set.
> >>>
> >>> My understanding is that only instructions in the constant-time subset
> >>> are ever guaranteed to be constant time.
> >>
> >> Hmm, yes, I did overlook respective wording in the doc.
> >>
> >>>  On architectures where DOITM
> >>> is not enumerated, this guarantee is unconditional.
> >>
> >> I have to admit I'm suspicious of this "guarantee".
> > 
> > Do you mean that previous CPUs had a vulnerability that has no fix?
> 
> I'm not sure I'd call it a vulnerability, but at least if going back far
> enough in history I think you'll find insns on the list which don't have
> invariant timing. Like with other documentation on e.g. speculation
> issues I take it that Intel simply doesn't consider sufficiently old
> CPUs relevant anymore for such new documents.

Any examples?
-- 
Sincerely,
Demi Marie Obenour (she/her/hers)
Invisible Things Lab

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