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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH v4 05/21] IOMMU/x86: restrict IO-APIC mappings for PV Dom0
On 04.05.2022 12:30, Roger Pau Monné wrote:
> On Wed, May 04, 2022 at 11:32:51AM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> On 03.05.2022 16:50, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>> On 03.05.2022 15:00, Roger Pau Monné wrote:
>>>> On Mon, Apr 25, 2022 at 10:34:23AM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>> While already the case for PVH, there's no reason to treat PV
>>>>> differently here, though of course the addresses get taken from another
>>>>> source in this case. Except that, to match CPU side mappings, by default
>>>>> we permit r/o ones. This then also means we now deal consistently with
>>>>> IO-APICs whose MMIO is or is not covered by E820 reserved regions.
>>>>>
>>>>> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
>>>>> ---
>>>>> [integrated] v1: Integrate into series.
>>>>> [standalone] v2: Keep IOMMU mappings in sync with CPU ones.
>>>>>
>>>>> --- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/x86/iommu.c
>>>>> +++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/x86/iommu.c
>>>>> @@ -275,12 +275,12 @@ void iommu_identity_map_teardown(struct
>>>>> }
>>>>> }
>>>>>
>>>>> -static bool __hwdom_init hwdom_iommu_map(const struct domain *d,
>>>>> - unsigned long pfn,
>>>>> - unsigned long max_pfn)
>>>>> +static unsigned int __hwdom_init hwdom_iommu_map(const struct domain *d,
>>>>> + unsigned long pfn,
>>>>> + unsigned long max_pfn)
>>>>> {
>>>>> mfn_t mfn = _mfn(pfn);
>>>>> - unsigned int i, type;
>>>>> + unsigned int i, type, perms = IOMMUF_readable | IOMMUF_writable;
>>>>>
>>>>> /*
>>>>> * Set up 1:1 mapping for dom0. Default to include only conventional
>>>>> RAM
>>>>> @@ -289,44 +289,60 @@ static bool __hwdom_init hwdom_iommu_map
>>>>> * that fall in unusable ranges for PV Dom0.
>>>>> */
>>>>> if ( (pfn > max_pfn && !mfn_valid(mfn)) || xen_in_range(pfn) )
>>>>> - return false;
>>>>> + return 0;
>>>>>
>>>>> switch ( type = page_get_ram_type(mfn) )
>>>>> {
>>>>> case RAM_TYPE_UNUSABLE:
>>>>> - return false;
>>>>> + return 0;
>>>>>
>>>>> case RAM_TYPE_CONVENTIONAL:
>>>>> if ( iommu_hwdom_strict )
>>>>> - return false;
>>>>> + return 0;
>>>>> break;
>>>>>
>>>>> default:
>>>>> if ( type & RAM_TYPE_RESERVED )
>>>>> {
>>>>> if ( !iommu_hwdom_inclusive && !iommu_hwdom_reserved )
>>>>> - return false;
>>>>> + perms = 0;
>>>>> }
>>>>> - else if ( is_hvm_domain(d) || !iommu_hwdom_inclusive || pfn >
>>>>> max_pfn )
>>>>> - return false;
>>>>> + else if ( is_hvm_domain(d) )
>>>>> + return 0;
>>>>> + else if ( !iommu_hwdom_inclusive || pfn > max_pfn )
>>>>> + perms = 0;
>>>>> }
>>>>>
>>>>> /* Check that it doesn't overlap with the Interrupt Address Range. */
>>>>> if ( pfn >= 0xfee00 && pfn <= 0xfeeff )
>>>>> - return false;
>>>>> + return 0;
>>>>> /* ... or the IO-APIC */
>>>>> - for ( i = 0; has_vioapic(d) && i < d->arch.hvm.nr_vioapics; i++ )
>>>>> - if ( pfn == PFN_DOWN(domain_vioapic(d, i)->base_address) )
>>>>> - return false;
>>>>> + if ( has_vioapic(d) )
>>>>> + {
>>>>> + for ( i = 0; i < d->arch.hvm.nr_vioapics; i++ )
>>>>> + if ( pfn == PFN_DOWN(domain_vioapic(d, i)->base_address) )
>>>>> + return 0;
>>>>> + }
>>>>> + else if ( is_pv_domain(d) )
>>>>> + {
>>>>> + /*
>>>>> + * Be consistent with CPU mappings: Dom0 is permitted to
>>>>> establish r/o
>>>>> + * ones there, so it should also have such established for
>>>>> IOMMUs.
>>>>> + */
>>>>> + for ( i = 0; i < nr_ioapics; i++ )
>>>>> + if ( pfn == PFN_DOWN(mp_ioapics[i].mpc_apicaddr) )
>>>>> + return rangeset_contains_singleton(mmio_ro_ranges, pfn)
>>>>> + ? IOMMUF_readable : 0;
>>>>
>>>> If we really are after consistency with CPU side mappings, we should
>>>> likely take the whole contents of mmio_ro_ranges and d->iomem_caps
>>>> into account, not just the pages belonging to the IO-APIC?
>>>>
>>>> There could also be HPET pages mapped as RO for PV.
>>>
>>> Hmm. This would be a yet bigger functional change, but indeed would further
>>> improve consistency. But shouldn't we then also establish r/w mappings for
>>> stuff in ->iomem_caps but not in mmio_ro_ranges? This would feel like going
>>> too far ...
>>
>> FTAOD I didn't mean to say that I think such mappings shouldn't be there;
>> I have been of the opinion that e.g. I/O directly to/from the linear
>> frame buffer of a graphics device should in principle be permitted. But
>> which specific mappings to put in place can imo not be derived from
>> ->iomem_caps, as we merely subtract certain ranges after initially having
>> set all bits in it. Besides ranges not mapping any MMIO, even something
>> like the PCI ECAM ranges (parts of which we may also force to r/o, and
>> which we would hence cover here if I followed your suggestion) are
>> questionable in this regard.
>
> Right, ->iomem_caps is indeed too wide for our purpose. What
> about using something like:
>
> else if ( is_pv_domain(d) )
> {
> if ( !iomem_access_permitted(d, pfn, pfn) )
> return 0;
We can't return 0 here (as RAM pages also make it here when
!iommu_hwdom_strict), so I can at best take this as a vague outline
of what you really mean. And I don't want to rely on RAM pages being
(imo wrongly) represented by set bits in Dom0's iomem_caps.
> if ( rangeset_contains_singleton(mmio_ro_ranges, pfn) )
> return IOMMUF_readable;
> }
>
> That would get us a bit closer to allowed CPU side mappings, and we
> don't need to special case IO-APIC or HPET addresses as those are
> already added to ->iomem_caps or mmio_ro_ranges respectively by
> dom0_setup_permissions().
This won't fit in a region of code framed by a (split) comment
saying "Check that it doesn't overlap with ...". Hence if anything
I could put something like this further down. Yet even then the
question remains what to do with ranges which pass
iomem_access_permitted() but
- aren't really MMIO,
- are inside MMCFG,
- are otherwise special.
Or did you perhaps mean to suggest something like
else if ( is_pv_domain(d) && iomem_access_permitted(d, pfn, pfn) &&
rangeset_contains_singleton(mmio_ro_ranges, pfn) )
return IOMMUF_readable;
? Then there would only remain the question of whether mapping r/o
MMCFG pages is okay (I don't think it is), but that could then be
special-cased similar to what's done further down for vPCI (by not
returning in the "else if", but merely updating "perms").
Jan
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