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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH v4 3/3] amd/msr: implement VIRT_SPEC_CTRL for HVM guests using legacy SSBD
On Fri, Apr 29, 2022 at 12:59:58PM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote:
> On 27.04.2022 12:47, Roger Pau Monne wrote:> Changes since v3:> - Align ssbd
> per-core struct to a cache line.> - Open code a simple spinlock to avoid
> playing tricks with the lock> detector.> - s/ssbd_core/ssbd_ls_cfg/.> -
> Fix log message wording.> - Fix define name and remove comment.> - Also
> handle Hygon processors (Fam18h).> - Add changelog entry.
> What is this last line about?
Hm, seems like I forgot to do a patch refresh... So new version will
have an entry about adding VIRT_SSBD support to HVM guests. Sorry for
spoiling the surprise.
> > +bool __init amd_setup_legacy_ssbd(void)
> > +{
> > + unsigned int i;
> > +
> > + if ((boot_cpu_data.x86 != 0x17 && boot_cpu_data.x86 != 0x18) ||
> > + boot_cpu_data.x86_num_siblings <= 1)
> > + return true;
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * One could be forgiven for thinking that c->x86_max_cores is the
> > + * correct value to use here.
> > + *
> > + * However, that value is derived from the current configuration, and
> > + * c->cpu_core_id is sparse on all but the top end CPUs. Derive
> > + * max_cpus from ApicIdCoreIdSize which will cover any sparseness.
> > + */
> > + if (boot_cpu_data.extended_cpuid_level >= 0x80000008) {
> > + ssbd_max_cores = 1u << MASK_EXTR(cpuid_ecx(0x80000008), 0xf000);
> > + ssbd_max_cores /= boot_cpu_data.x86_num_siblings;
> > + }
> > + if (!ssbd_max_cores)
> > + return false;
> > +
> > + ssbd_ls_cfg = xzalloc_array(struct ssbd_ls_cfg,
> > + ssbd_max_cores * AMD_FAM17H_MAX_SOCKETS);
> > + if (!ssbd_ls_cfg)
> > + return false;
> > +
> > + for (i = 0; i < ssbd_max_cores * AMD_FAM17H_MAX_SOCKETS; i++)
> > + /* Record initial state, also applies to any hotplug CPU. */
> > + if (opt_ssbd)
> > + ssbd_ls_cfg[i].count = boot_cpu_data.x86_num_siblings;
>
> Perhaps flip if() and for()?
Indeed, thanks.
> > +void amd_set_legacy_ssbd(bool enable)
> > +{
> > + const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = ¤t_cpu_data;
> > + struct ssbd_ls_cfg *status;
> > +
> > + if (c->x86 != 0x17 || c->x86_num_siblings <= 1) {
> > + BUG_ON(!set_legacy_ssbd(c, enable));
> > + return;
> > + }
> > +
> > + BUG_ON(c->phys_proc_id >= AMD_FAM17H_MAX_SOCKETS);
> > + BUG_ON(c->cpu_core_id >= ssbd_max_cores);
> > + status = &ssbd_ls_cfg[c->phys_proc_id * ssbd_max_cores +
> > + c->cpu_core_id];
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * Open code a very simple spinlock: this function is used with GIF==0
> > + * and different IF values, so would trigger the checklock detector.
> > + * Instead of trying to workaround the detector, use a very simple lock
> > + * implementation: it's better to reduce the amount of code executed
> > + * with GIF==0.
> > + */
> > + while ( test_and_set_bool(status->locked) )
> > + cpu_relax();
> > + status->count += enable ? 1 : -1;
> > + ASSERT(status->count <= c->x86_num_siblings);
> > + if (enable ? status->count == 1 : !status->count)
> > + BUG_ON(!set_legacy_ssbd(c, enable));
>
> What are the effects of ASSERT() or BUG_ON() triggering in a GIF=0
> region?
So AFAICT the BUG itself works, the usage of a crash kernel however
won't work as it's booted with GIF==0.
Maybe we need to issue an stgi as part of BUG_FRAME if required?
(maybe that's too naive...)
> > --- a/xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c
> > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c
> > @@ -544,6 +544,16 @@ static void __init calculate_hvm_max_policy(void)
> > if ( !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM) )
> > /* Clear VIRT_SSBD if VIRT_SPEC_CTRL is not exposed to guests. */
> > __clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD, hvm_featureset);
> > + else
> > + /*
> > + * Expose VIRT_SSBD if VIRT_SPEC_CTRL is supported, as that
> > implies the
> > + * underlying hardware is capable of setting SSBD using
> > + * non-architectural way or VIRT_SSBD is available.
> > + *
> > + * Note that if the hardware supports VIRT_SSBD natively this
> > setting
> > + * will just override an already set bit.
> > + */
> > + __set_bit(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD, hvm_featureset);
>
> With the 's' annotation gone from the public header, is this last
> sentence of the comment actually true? Aiui code near the top of
> the function would have zapped the bit from hvm_featureset[].
This comment is now gone, and there are no changes to
calculate_hvm_max_policy in this patch anymore.
> > --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
> > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
> > @@ -3126,6 +3126,8 @@ void vmexit_virt_spec_ctrl(void)
> >
> > if ( cpu_has_virt_ssbd )
> > wrmsr(MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, val, 0);
> > + else
> > + amd_set_legacy_ssbd(opt_ssbd);
>
> Nit: Indentation is off by one here. Of course this alone could
> easily be adjusted while committing.
>
> > @@ -3138,6 +3140,9 @@ void vmentry_virt_spec_ctrl(void)
> >
> > if ( cpu_has_virt_ssbd )
> > wrmsr(MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, current->arch.msrs->virt_spec_ctrl.raw,
> > 0);
> > + else
> > + amd_set_legacy_ssbd(current->arch.msrs->virt_spec_ctrl.raw &
> > + SPEC_CTRL_SSBD);
>
> Would seem cheaper to use !val here (and then val for symmetry in
> the other function).
I could even use !opt_ssbd, and that would be more similar to what's
done in vmexit_virt_spec_ctrl?
Thanks, Roger.
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