[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [XEN PATCH] tools/libs/light/libxl_pci.c: explicitly grant access to Intel IGD opregion
On 3/31/2022 8:29 AM, Jason Andryuk wrote: On Wed, Mar 30, 2022 at 11:54 PM Chuck Zmudzinski <brchuckz@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:On 3/30/22 1:27 PM, Andrew Cooper wrote:This has been discussed before, but noone's done anything about it. It's a massive layering violation for QEMU to issue xc_domain_iomem_permission()/etc hypercalls. It should be the toolstack, and only the toolstack, which makes permissions hypercalls, which in turn will fix a slew of "QEMU doesn't work when it doesn't have dom0 superpowers" bugs with stubdomains.How much say does the Xen project have over the code in Qemu under hw/xen? I would not be against having libxl do the permissions hypercalls in this case instead of Qemu doing it. My test with Qemu traditional and this patch proves the permission can be granted by libxl instead of the device model.Qubes patches libxl and QEMU, and they move the hypercalls to the toolstack. They are using linux stubdoms, and I think it works for them. That still doesn't answer my question - will the Qemu upstream accept the patches that move the hypercalls to the toolstack? If not, we have to live with what we have now, which is that the hypercalls are done in Qemu. Regards, Chuck
|
![]() |
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |