[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] RE: x86/vmx: Don't spuriously crash the domain when INIT is received
> From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> > Sent: Monday, February 28, 2022 3:36 PM > > On 25.02.2022 18:11, Andrew Cooper wrote: > > On 25/02/2022 13:19, Jan Beulich wrote: > >> On 25.02.2022 13:28, Andrew Cooper wrote: > >>> On 25/02/2022 08:44, Jan Beulich wrote: > >>>> On 24.02.2022 20:48, Andrew Cooper wrote: > >>>>> In VMX operation, the handling of INIT IPIs is changed. > EXIT_REASON_INIT has > >>>>> nothing to do with the guest in question, simply signals that an INIT > was > >>>>> received. > >>>>> > >>>>> Ignoring the INIT is probably the wrong thing to do, but is helpful for > >>>>> debugging. Crashing the domain which happens to be in context is > definitely > >>>>> wrong. Print an error message and continue. > >>>>> > >>>>> Discovered as collateral damage from when an AP triple faults on S3 > resume on > >>>>> Intel TigerLake platforms. > >>>> I'm afraid I don't follow the scenario, which was (only) outlined in > >>>> patch 1: Why would the BSP receive INIT in this case? > >>> SHUTDOWN is a signal emitted by a core when it can't continue. Triple > >>> fault is one cause, but other sources include a double #MC, etc. > >>> > >>> Some external component, in the PCH I expect, needs to turn this into a > >>> platform reset, because one malfunctioning core can't. It is why a > >>> triple fault on any logical processor brings the whole system down. > >> I'm afraid this doesn't answer my question. Clearly the system didn't > >> shut down. > > > > Indeed, *because* Xen caught and ignored the INIT which was otherwise > > supposed to do it. > > > >> Hence I still don't see why the BSP would see INIT in the > >> first place. > >> > >>>> And it also cannot be that the INIT was received by the vCPU while > running on > >>>> another CPU: > >>> It's nothing (really) to do with the vCPU. INIT is a external signal to > >>> the (real) APIC, just like NMI/etc. > >>> > >>> It is the next VMEntry on a CPU which received INIT that suffers a > >>> VMEntry failure, and the VMEntry failure has nothing to do with the > >>> contents of the VMCS. > >>> > >>> Importantly for Xen however, this isn't applicable for scheduling PV > >>> vCPUs, which is why dom0 wasn't the one that crashed. This actually > >>> meant that dom0 was alive an usable, albeit it sharing all vCPUs on a > >>> single CPU. > >>> > >>> > >>> The change in INIT behaviour exists for TXT, where is it critical that > >>> software can clear secrets from RAM before resetting. I'm not wanting > >>> to get into any of that because it's far more complicated than I have > >>> time to fix. > >> I guess there's something hidden behind what you say here, like INIT > >> only being latched, but this latched state then causing the VM entry > >> failure. Which would mean that really the INIT was a signal for the > >> system to shut down / shutting down. > > > > Yes. why is INIT latched in root mode (take effect until vmentry) instead of directly causing the CPU to reset? > > > >> In which case arranging to > >> continue by ignoring the event in VMX looks wrong. Simply crashing > >> the guest would then be wrong as well, of course. We should shut > >> down instead. > > > > It is software's discretion what to do when an INIT is caught, even if > > the expectation is to honour it fairly promptly. > > > >> But I don't think I see the full picture here yet, unless your > >> mentioning of TXT was actually implying that TXT was active at the > >> point of the crash (which I don't think was said anywhere). > > > > This did cause confusion during debugging. As far as we can tell, TXT > > is not active, but the observed behaviour certainly looks like TXT is > > active. > > > > Then again, reset is a platform behaviour, not architectural. Also, > > it's my understanding that Intel does not support S3 on TigerLake > > (opting to only support S0ix instead), so I'm guessing that "Linux S3" > > as it's called in the menu is something retrofitted by the OEM. > > > > But overall, the point isn't really about what triggered the INIT. We > > also shouldn't nuke an innocent VM if an INIT IPI slips through > > interrupt remapping. > > But we also shouldn't continue in such a case as if nothing had happened > at all, should we? > Now there are two problems: 1) An innocent VM is killed; 2) The system continues as if nothing had happened; Andrew's patch fixes 1) which imo is welcomed anyway. 2) certainly needs more work but could come after 1). Thanks Kevin
|
![]() |
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |