[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH] x86/hvm: Fix boot on systems where HVM isn't available
On 05.02.2022 10:47, Roger Pau Monné wrote: > On Fri, Feb 04, 2022 at 05:34:05PM +0000, Andrew Cooper wrote: >> c/s 27a63cdac388 ("x86/HVM: convert remaining hvm_funcs hook invocations to >> alt-call") went too far with dropping NULL function pointer checks. Oh, I'm sorry, I should have noticed this. >> smp_callin() calls hvm_cpu_up() unconditionally. When the platform doesn't >> support HVM, hvm_enable() exits without filling in hvm_funcs, after which the >> altcall pass nukes the (now unconditional) indirect call, causing: >> >> (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.17.0-10.18-d x86_64 debug=y Not tainted ]---- >> (XEN) CPU: 1 >> (XEN) RIP: e008:[<ffff82d04034bef5>] start_secondary+0x393/0x3b7 >> (XEN) RFLAGS: 0000000000010086 CONTEXT: hypervisor >> ... >> (XEN) Xen code around <ffff82d04034bef5> (start_secondary+0x393/0x3b7): >> (XEN) ff ff 8b 05 1b 84 17 00 <0f> 0b 0f ff ff 90 89 c3 85 c0 0f 84 db fe >> ff ff >> ... >> (XEN) Xen call trace: >> (XEN) [<ffff82d04034bef5>] R start_secondary+0x393/0x3b7 >> (XEN) [<ffff82d0402000e2>] F __high_start+0x42/0x60 >> >> To make matters worse, __stop_this_cpu() calls hvm_cpu_down() unconditionally >> too, so what happen next is: >> >> (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.17.0-10.18-d x86_64 debug=y Not tainted ]---- >> (XEN) CPU: 0 >> (XEN) RIP: e008:[<ffff82d04034ab02>] __stop_this_cpu+0x12/0x3c >> (XEN) RFLAGS: 0000000000010046 CONTEXT: hypervisor >> ... >> (XEN) Xen code around <ffff82d04034ab02> (__stop_this_cpu+0x12/0x3c): >> (XEN) 48 89 e5 e8 8a 1d fd ff <0f> 0b 0f ff ff 90 0f 06 db e3 48 89 e0 48 >> 0d ff >> ... >> (XEN) Xen call trace: >> (XEN) [<ffff82d04034ab02>] R __stop_this_cpu+0x12/0x3c >> (XEN) [<ffff82d04034ac15>] F smp_send_stop+0xdd/0xf8 >> (XEN) [<ffff82d04034a229>] F machine_restart+0xa2/0x298 >> (XEN) [<ffff82d04034a42a>] F >> arch/x86/shutdown.c#__machine_restart+0xb/0x11 >> (XEN) [<ffff82d04022fd15>] F smp_call_function_interrupt+0xbf/0xea >> (XEN) [<ffff82d04034acc6>] F call_function_interrupt+0x35/0x37 >> (XEN) [<ffff82d040331a70>] F do_IRQ+0xa3/0x6b5 >> (XEN) [<ffff82d04039482a>] F common_interrupt+0x10a/0x120 >> (XEN) [<ffff82d04031f649>] F __udelay+0x3a/0x51 >> (XEN) [<ffff82d04034d5fb>] F __cpu_up+0x48f/0x734 >> (XEN) [<ffff82d040203c2b>] F cpu_up+0x7d/0xde >> (XEN) [<ffff82d0404543d3>] F __start_xen+0x200b/0x2618 >> (XEN) [<ffff82d0402000ef>] F __high_start+0x4f/0x60 >> >> which recurses until hitting a stack overflow. The #DF handler, which resets >> its stack on each invocation, loops indefinitely. >> >> Reinstate the NULL function pointer checks for hvm_cpu_{up,down}(). >> >> Fixes: 27a63cdac388 ("x86/HVM: convert remaining hvm_funcs hook invocations >> to alt-call") >> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> > > Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> >> --- >> CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx> >> CC: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> >> CC: Wei Liu <wl@xxxxxxx> >> >> RFC. Not tested yet on the imacted hardware. It's a Xeon PHI with another >> werid thing in need of debugging. First boot is fine, while second >> boot (loading microcode this time) has a problem with vmx. Sounds not unfamiliar: My meanwhile oldish Romley needs to be cold- booted for VMX to actually be usable (not locked) on APs. >> I wonder if we want to modify the callers to check for HVM being enabled, >> rather than leaving the NULL pointer checks in a position where they're >> liable >> to be reaped again. > > What about adding a couple of comments to hvm_cpu_{up,down} to note > they are called unconditionally regardless of whether HVM is present > or not? I second this as the perhaps better alternative: The S3 path is similarly affected (and you may want to mention this in the description), so this would mean up to 5 conditionals (at the source level) instead of the just two you get away with here. Jan
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