[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [PATCH 5/8] x86/spec-ctrl: Introduce new has_spec_ctrl boolean
Most MSR_SPEC_CTRL setup will be common between Intel and AMD. Instead of opencoding an OR of two features everywhere, introduce has_spec_ctrl instead. Reword the comment above the Intel specific alternatives block to highlight that it is Intel specific, and pull the setting of default_xen_spec_ctrl.IBRS out because it will want to be common. No functional change. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> --- CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx> CC: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> CC: Wei Liu <wl@xxxxxxx> --- xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c | 22 +++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c index 8a550d0a0902..2072daf66245 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c @@ -927,7 +927,7 @@ static __init void mds_calculations(uint64_t caps) void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void) { enum ind_thunk thunk = THUNK_DEFAULT; - bool ibrs = false, hw_smt_enabled; + bool has_spec_ctrl, ibrs = false, hw_smt_enabled; bool cpu_has_bug_taa; uint64_t caps = 0; @@ -936,6 +936,8 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void) hw_smt_enabled = check_smt_enabled(); + has_spec_ctrl = boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB); + /* * First, disable the use of retpolines if Xen is using shadow stacks, as * they are incompatible. @@ -973,11 +975,11 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void) */ else if ( retpoline_safe(caps) ) thunk = THUNK_RETPOLINE; - else if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB) ) + else if ( has_spec_ctrl ) ibrs = true; } /* Without compiler thunk support, use IBRS if available. */ - else if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB) ) + else if ( has_spec_ctrl ) ibrs = true; } @@ -1008,10 +1010,7 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void) else if ( thunk == THUNK_JMP ) setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IND_THUNK_JMP); - /* - * If we are on hardware supporting MSR_SPEC_CTRL, see about setting up - * the alternatives blocks so we can virtualise support for guests. - */ + /* Intel hardware: MSR_SPEC_CTRL alternatives setup. */ if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB) ) { if ( opt_msr_sc_pv ) @@ -1030,11 +1029,12 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void) default_spec_ctrl_flags |= SCF_ist_wrmsr; setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM); } - - if ( ibrs ) - default_xen_spec_ctrl |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; } + /* If we have IBRS available, see whether we should use it. */ + if ( has_spec_ctrl && ibrs ) + default_xen_spec_ctrl |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; + /* If we have SSBD available, see whether we should use it. */ if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSBD) && opt_ssbd ) default_xen_spec_ctrl |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD; @@ -1268,7 +1268,7 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void) * boot won't have any other code running in a position to mount an * attack. */ - if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB) ) + if ( has_spec_ctrl ) { bsp_delay_spec_ctrl = !cpu_has_hypervisor && default_xen_spec_ctrl; -- 2.11.0
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