[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH V4] xen/gnttab: Store frame GFN in struct page_info on Arm
Hi Oleksandr, On 14/12/2021 17:26, Oleksandr wrote: May I suggest to avoid failing here when page_get_xenheap_gfn(mfn_to_page(mfn))@@ -1487,7 +1489,23 @@ int xenmem_add_to_physmap_one( } /* Map at new location. */ - rc = guest_physmap_add_entry(d, gfn, mfn, 0, t); + if ( !p2m_is_ram(t) || !is_xen_heap_mfn(mfn) ) + rc = guest_physmap_add_entry(d, gfn, mfn, 0, t); + else + { + struct p2m_domain *p2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d); + + p2m_write_lock(p2m);+ if ( gfn_eq(page_get_xenheap_gfn(mfn_to_page(mfn)), INVALID_GFN) )+ {+ rc = p2m_set_entry(p2m, gfn, 1, mfn, t, p2m->default_access);+ if ( !rc ) + page_set_xenheap_gfn(mfn_to_page(mfn), gfn); + } + else + rc = -EBUSY;matches the passed in GFN?Good question...There was an explicit request to fail here if page_get_xenheap_gfn() returns a valid GFN. From the other side, if old GFN matches new GFN we do not remove the mapping in gnttab_set_frame_gfn(), so probably we could avoid failing here in that particular case. @Julien, what do you think? I will answer by a question :). Can this situation happen in normal circumstances (e.g. there is no concurrent call)? The recent XSAs in the grant table code made me more cautious and I would prefer if we fail more often than risking potentially introducing yet another security issue. It is easy to relax afterwards if there are legitimate use cases. Cheers, -- Julien Grall
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