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Re: [PATCH] xen/arm: optee: Allocate anonymous domheap pages



On Mon, 6 Sep 2021, Oleksandr Tyshchenko wrote:
> From: Oleksandr Tyshchenko <oleksandr_tyshchenko@xxxxxxxx>
> 
> Allocate anonymous domheap pages as there is no strict need to
> account them to a particular domain.
> 
> Since XSA-383 "xen/arm: Restrict the amount of memory that dom0less
> domU and dom0 can allocate" the dom0 cannot allocate memory outside
> of the pre-allocated region. This means if we try to allocate
> non-anonymous page to be accounted to dom0 we will get an
> over-allocation issue when assigning that page to the domain.
> The anonymous page, in turn, is not assigned to any domain.
> 
> CC: Julien Grall <jgrall@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Tyshchenko <oleksandr_tyshchenko@xxxxxxxx>
> Acked-by: Volodymyr Babchuk <volodymyr_babchuk@xxxxxxxx>

Only one question, which is more architectural: given that these pages
are "unlimited", could the guest exploit the interface somehow to force
Xen to allocate an very high number of anonymous pages?

E.g. could a domain call OPTEE_SMC_RPC_FUNC_ALLOC in a loop to force Xen
to exaust all memory pages?



> ---
>  xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c | 6 +++---
>  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c b/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c
> index 3453615..83b4994 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c
> @@ -410,7 +410,7 @@ static struct shm_rpc *allocate_and_pin_shm_rpc(struct 
> optee_domain *ctx,
>      if ( !shm_rpc )
>          return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
>  
> -    shm_rpc->xen_arg_pg = alloc_domheap_page(current->domain, 0);
> +    shm_rpc->xen_arg_pg = alloc_domheap_page(NULL, 0);
>      if ( !shm_rpc->xen_arg_pg )
>      {
>          xfree(shm_rpc);
> @@ -774,7 +774,7 @@ static int translate_noncontig(struct optee_domain *ctx,
>       * - There is a plan to implement preemption in the code below, which
>       *   will allow use to increase default MAX_SHM_BUFFER_PG value.
>       */
> -    xen_pgs = alloc_domheap_pages(current->domain, order, 0);
> +    xen_pgs = alloc_domheap_pages(NULL, order, 0);
>      if ( !xen_pgs )
>          return -ENOMEM;
>  
> @@ -938,7 +938,7 @@ static bool copy_std_request(struct cpu_user_regs *regs,
>  
>      BUILD_BUG_ON(OPTEE_MSG_NONCONTIG_PAGE_SIZE > PAGE_SIZE);
>  
> -    call->xen_arg_pg = alloc_domheap_page(current->domain, 0);
> +    call->xen_arg_pg = alloc_domheap_page(NULL, 0);
>      if ( !call->xen_arg_pg )
>      {
>          set_user_reg(regs, 0, OPTEE_SMC_RETURN_ENOMEM);
> -- 
> 2.7.4
> 



 


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