[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH] SUPPORT.md: add Dom0less as Supported
Hi Stefano, On 14/07/2021 20:28, Stefano Stabellini wrote: On Wed, 14 Jul 2021, Julien Grall wrote:Hi Stefano, On 14/07/2021 01:39, Stefano Stabellini wrote:Add Dom0less to SUPPORT.md to clarify its support status. The feature is mature enough and small enough to make it security supported. Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxx> diff --git a/SUPPORT.md b/SUPPORT.md index 317392d8f3..c777f3da72 100644 --- a/SUPPORT.md +++ b/SUPPORT.md @@ -832,6 +832,12 @@ OVMF firmware implements the UEFI boot protocol. Status, qemu-xen: Supported +## Dom0less + +Guest creation from the hypervisor at boot without Dom0 intervention. + + Status, ARM: Supported +After XSA-372, we will not scrubbed memory assigned to dom0less DomU when bootscrub=on.Do you mean *before* XSA-372, right? No, I really meant *after* XSA-372. I thought the XSA-372 patches take care of the problem? It didn't. We have an open question for the bootscrub=on one. From the commit message of patch #1: 2) The memory allocated for a domU will not be scrubbed anymore when an admin select bootscrub=on. This is not something we advertised, but if this is a concern we can introduce either force scrub for all domUs or a per-domain flag in the DT. The behavior for bootscrub=off and bootscrub=idle (default) has not changed. >Do we want to exclude this combination or mention that XSAs will not be issued if the domU can read secret from unscrubbed memory?I could say that if bootscrub=off then we won't issue XSAs for domUs reading secrets from unscrubbed memory. But it is kind of obvious anyway? I am happy to add it if you think it is good to clarify. Right, it is pretty clear that bootscrub=off will not scrub the memory and the "problem" would not be specific to dom0less. The one I asked to clarify is bootscrub=on because one may think the memory is scrubbed for dom0less domU for all the cases but bootscrub=off. IIRC when we discussed about it on security@xxxxxxx, we suggested that it would be fine to rely on the bootloader to scrub it. But I think this needs to be written down rather waiting for it to be re-discovered. The other solution is to fix it properly. Cheers, -- Julien Grall
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