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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH 2/2] tools/migration: Fix potential overflow in send_checkpoint_dirty_pfn_list()
On 06/07/2021 13:03, Jan Beulich wrote:
> On 06.07.2021 13:23, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>> 'count * sizeof(*pfns)' can in principle overflow, but is implausible in
>> practice as the time between checkpoints is typically sub-second.
>> Nevertheless, simplify the code and remove the risk.
>>
>> There is no need to loop over the bitmap to calculate count. The number of
>> set bits is returned in xc_shadow_op_stats_t which is already collected (and
>> ignored).
>>
>> Bounds check the count against what will fit in REC_LENGTH_MAX. At the time
>> of writing, this allows up to 0xffffff pfns.
> Well, okay, this then means that an overflow in the reporting of
> dirty_count doesn't matter for now, because the limit is lower
> anyway.
>
>> Rearrange the pfns loop to check
>> for errors both ways, not simply that there were more pfns than expected.
> Hmm, "both ways" to me would mean ...
>
>> @@ -459,24 +462,20 @@ static int send_checkpoint_dirty_pfn_list(struct
>> xc_sr_context *ctx)
>> goto err;
>> }
>>
>> - for ( i = 0, written = 0; i < ctx->restore.p2m_size; ++i )
>> + for ( i = 0, written = 0; count && i < ctx->restore.p2m_size; ++i,
>> --count )
>> {
>> if ( !test_bit(i, dirty_bitmap) )
>> continue;
>>
>> - if ( written > count )
>> - {
>> - ERROR("Dirty pfn list exceed");
>> - goto err;
>> - }
>> -
>> pfns[written++] = i;
>> }
>>
>> - rec.length = count * sizeof(*pfns);
>> -
>> - iov[1].iov_base = pfns;
>> - iov[1].iov_len = rec.length;
>> + if ( written != stats.dirty_count )
>> + {
>> + ERROR("Mismatch between dirty bitmap bits (%u), and dirty_count
>> (%u)",
>> + written, stats.dirty_count);
>> + goto err;
>> + }
> ... you then also check that there are no further bit set in the
> bitmap. As said elsewhere, I'm not convinced using statistics as
> a basis for actual operation (rather than just reporting) is
> appropriate.
I'm not interested in inference based on the name of the structure.
> I'm unaware of there being any spelled out guarantee
> that the numbers reported back from the hypercall are accurate.
The live loop uses this information already for this purpose. If it is
wrong, we've got bigger problems that this.
~Andrew
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