Re: [PATCH][4.15] x86: mirror compat argument translation area for 32-bit PV

[Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>]

On 22.02.2021 15:14, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 22/02/2021 10:27, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> Now that we guard the entire Xen VA space against speculative abuse
>> through hypervisor accesses to guest memory, the argument translation
>> area's VA also needs to live outside this range, at least for 32-bit PV
>> guests. To avoid extra is_hvm_*() conditionals, use the alternative VA
>> uniformly.
>>
>> While this could be conditionalized upon CONFIG_PV32 &&
>> CONFIG_SPECULATIVE_HARDEN_GUEST_ACCESS, omitting such extra conditionals
>> keeps the code more legible imo.
>>
>> Fixes: 4dc181599142 ("x86/PV: harden guest memory accesses against 
>> speculative abuse")
>> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
>>
>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
>> @@ -1727,6 +1727,11 @@ void init_xen_l4_slots(l4_pgentry_t *l4t
>>                 (ROOT_PAGETABLE_FIRST_XEN_SLOT + slots -
>>                  l4_table_offset(XEN_VIRT_START)) * sizeof(*l4t));
>>      }
>> +
>> +    /* Slot 511: Per-domain mappings mirror. */
>> +    if ( !is_pv_64bit_domain(d) )
>> +        l4t[l4_table_offset(PERDOMAIN2_VIRT_START)] =
>> +            l4e_from_page(d->arch.perdomain_l3_pg, __PAGE_HYPERVISOR_RW);
> 
> This virtual address is inside the extended directmap.

No. That one covers only the range excluding the last L4 slot.

>  You're going to
> need to rearrange more things than just this, to make it safe.

I specifically picked that entry because I don't think further
arrangements are needed.

> While largely a theoretical risk as far as the directmap goes, there is
> now a rather higher risk of colliding with the ERR_PTR() range.  Its bad
> enough this infrastructure is inherently unsafe with 64bit PV guests,

The ERR_PTR() range is still _far_ away from the sub-ranges we
use in the per-domain area.

Jan