[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH] x86/xen: avoid warning in Xen pv guest with CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT enabled
On 25.01.21 18:26, Andrew Cooper wrote: On 25/01/2021 14:00, Juergen Gross wrote:diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c index 4409306364dc..82948251f57b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c +++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c @@ -583,6 +583,14 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW(xenpv_exc_debug) exc_debug(regs); }+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT+DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW(xenpv_exc_vmm_communication) +{ + /* This should never happen and there is no way to handle it. */ + panic("X86_TRAP_VC in Xen PV mode.");Honestly, exactly the same is true of #VE, #HV and #SX. What we do in the hypervisor is wire up one handler for all unknown exceptions (to avoid potential future #DF issues) leading to a panic. Wouldn't it be better to do this unconditionally, especially as #GP/#NP doesn't work for PV guests for unregistered callbacks, rather than fixing up piecewise like this? I agree it would be better to have a "catch all unknown" handler. I'll have a try how this would look like. Juergen Attachment:
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