[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [PATCH 00/17] x86/PV: avoid speculation abuse through guest accessors plus ...
... shadow adjustments towards not building 2- and 3-level code when !HVM. While the latter isn't functionally related to the former, it depends on some of the rearrangements done there. 01: shadow: use __put_user() instead of __copy_to_user() 02: split __{get,put}_user() into "guest" and "unsafe" variants 03: split __copy_{from,to}_user() into "guest" and "unsafe" variants 04: PV: harden guest memory accesses against speculative abuse 05: rename {get,put}_user() to {get,put}_guest() 06: gdbsx: convert "user" to "guest" accesses 07: rename copy_{from,to}_user() to copy_{from,to}_guest_pv() 08: move stac()/clac() from {get,put}_unsafe_asm() ... 09: PV: use get_unsafe() instead of copy_from_unsafe() 10: shadow: use get_unsafe() instead of copy_from_unsafe() 11: shadow: polish shadow_write_entries() 12: shadow: move shadow_set_l<N>e() to their own source file 13: shadow: don't open-code SHF_* shorthands 14: shadow: SH_type_l2h_shadow is PV-only 15: shadow: drop SH_type_l2h_pae_shadow 16: shadow: only 4-level guest code needs building when !HVM 17: shadow: adjust is_pv_*() checks Jan
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