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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH for-4.15 3/4] [RFC] xen/iommu: x86: Clear the root page-table before freeing the page-tables
Hi, On 23/12/2020 16:11, Jan Beulich wrote: On 23.12.2020 16:16, Julien Grall wrote:On 23/12/2020 15:00, Jan Beulich wrote:On 23.12.2020 15:56, Julien Grall wrote:On 23/12/2020 14:12, Jan Beulich wrote:On 22.12.2020 16:43, Julien Grall wrote:This is an RFC because it would break AMD IOMMU driver. One option would be to move the call to the teardown callback earlier on. Any opinions? It doesn't allocate memory, but it will try to access the IOMMU page-tables (see more below). Even if this patch is deemed to be unecessary to fix the issue. This issue was quite hard to chase/reproduce. I think it would still be good to harden the code by zeroing hd->arch.vtd.pgd_maddr to avoid anyone else wasting 2 days because the pointer was still "valid".But my point was that this zeroing already happens. What Isuspect is that it gets re-populated after it was zeroed, because of page table manipulation that shouldn't be occurring anymore for a dying domain. AFAICT, the zeroing is happening in ->teardown() helper.It is only called when the domain is fully destroyed (see call in arch_domain_destroy()). This will happen much after relinquishing the code. Could you clarify why you think it is already zeroed and by who? Cheers, -- Julien Grall
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