[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH 7/8] x86/hvm: Drop restore boolean from hvm_cr4_guest_valid_bits()
On 01/10/2020 12:00, Roger Pau Monné wrote: > On Wed, Sep 30, 2020 at 02:42:47PM +0100, Andrew Cooper wrote: >> Previously, migration was reordered so the CPUID data was available before >> register state. nestedhvm_enabled() has recently been made accurate for the >> entire lifetime of the domain. >> >> Therefore, we can drop the bodge in hvm_cr4_guest_valid_bits() which existed >> previously to tolerate a guests' CR4 being set/restored before >> HVM_PARAM_NESTEDHVM. >> >> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> > Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> Thanks, > > Thanks, just one nit below. > >> --- >> CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx> >> CC: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> >> CC: Wei Liu <wl@xxxxxxx> >> CC: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@xxxxxxxxx> >> CC: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@xxxxxxxxx> >> --- >> xen/arch/x86/hvm/domain.c | 2 +- >> xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 8 ++++---- >> xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svmdebug.c | 6 ++++-- >> xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c | 2 +- >> xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c | 2 +- >> xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h | 2 +- >> 6 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/domain.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/domain.c >> index 8e3375265c..0ce132b308 100644 >> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/domain.c >> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/domain.c >> @@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ int arch_set_info_hvm_guest(struct vcpu *v, const >> vcpu_hvm_context_t *ctx) >> if ( v->arch.hvm.guest_efer & EFER_LME ) >> v->arch.hvm.guest_efer |= EFER_LMA; >> >> - if ( v->arch.hvm.guest_cr[4] & ~hvm_cr4_guest_valid_bits(d, false) ) >> + if ( v->arch.hvm.guest_cr[4] & ~hvm_cr4_guest_valid_bits(d) ) >> { >> gprintk(XENLOG_ERR, "Bad CR4 value: %#016lx\n", >> v->arch.hvm.guest_cr[4]); >> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c >> index 101a739952..54e32e4fe8 100644 >> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c >> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c >> @@ -972,14 +972,14 @@ const char *hvm_efer_valid(const struct vcpu *v, >> uint64_t value, >> X86_CR0_CD | X86_CR0_PG))) >> >> /* These bits in CR4 can be set by the guest. */ >> -unsigned long hvm_cr4_guest_valid_bits(const struct domain *d, bool restore) >> +unsigned long hvm_cr4_guest_valid_bits(const struct domain *d) >> { >> const struct cpuid_policy *p = d->arch.cpuid; >> bool mce, vmxe; >> >> /* Logic broken out simply to aid readability below. */ >> mce = p->basic.mce || p->basic.mca; >> - vmxe = p->basic.vmx && (restore || nestedhvm_enabled(d)); >> + vmxe = p->basic.vmx && nestedhvm_enabled(d); >> >> return ((p->basic.vme ? X86_CR4_VME | X86_CR4_PVI : 0) | >> (p->basic.tsc ? X86_CR4_TSD : 0) | >> @@ -1033,7 +1033,7 @@ static int hvm_load_cpu_ctxt(struct domain *d, >> hvm_domain_context_t *h) >> return -EINVAL; >> } >> >> - if ( ctxt.cr4 & ~hvm_cr4_guest_valid_bits(d, true) ) >> + if ( ctxt.cr4 & ~hvm_cr4_guest_valid_bits(d) ) >> { >> printk(XENLOG_G_ERR "HVM%d restore: bad CR4 %#" PRIx64 "\n", >> d->domain_id, ctxt.cr4); >> @@ -2425,7 +2425,7 @@ int hvm_set_cr4(unsigned long value, bool may_defer) >> struct vcpu *v = current; >> unsigned long old_cr; >> >> - if ( value & ~hvm_cr4_guest_valid_bits(v->domain, false) ) >> + if ( value & ~hvm_cr4_guest_valid_bits(v->domain) ) >> { >> HVM_DBG_LOG(DBG_LEVEL_1, >> "Guest attempts to set reserved bit in CR4: %lx", >> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svmdebug.c >> b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svmdebug.c >> index ba26b6a80b..f450391df4 100644 >> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svmdebug.c >> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svmdebug.c >> @@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ bool svm_vmcb_isvalid(const char *from, const struct >> vmcb_struct *vmcb, >> unsigned long cr0 = vmcb_get_cr0(vmcb); >> unsigned long cr3 = vmcb_get_cr3(vmcb); >> unsigned long cr4 = vmcb_get_cr4(vmcb); >> + unsigned long valid; > Could you init valid here at definition time? Also cr4_valid might be > a better name since the sacope of the variable is quite wide. I have some further cleanup in mind, which is why I did it like this. ~Andrew
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