[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Ping: [PATCH] x86: guard against port I/O overlapping the RTC/CMOS range
On 24.07.2020 16:19, Jan Beulich wrote: > On 24.07.2020 14:11, Andrew Cooper wrote: >> On 17/07/2020 14:10, Jan Beulich wrote: >>> Since we intercept RTC/CMOS port accesses, let's do so consistently in >>> all cases, i.e. also for e.g. a dword access to [006E,0071]. To avoid >>> the risk of unintended impact on Dom0 code actually doing so (despite >>> the belief that none ought to exist), also extend >>> guest_io_{read,write}() to decompose accesses where some ports are >>> allowed to be directly accessed and some aren't. >>> >>> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> >>> >>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c >>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c >>> @@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ static bool admin_io_okay(unsigned int p >>> return false; >>> >>> /* We also never permit direct access to the RTC/CMOS registers. */ >>> - if ( ((port & ~1) == RTC_PORT(0)) ) >>> + if ( port <= RTC_PORT(1) && port + bytes > RTC_PORT(0) ) >>> return false; >> >> This first hunk is fine. >> >> However, why decompose anything? Any disallowed port in the range >> terminates the entire access, and doesn't internally shrink the access. > > What tells you that adjacent ports (e.g. 006E and 006F to match > the example in the description) are disallowed? The typical > case here is Dom0 (as mentioned in the description), which has > access to most of the ports. Are you okay with this answer, and hence may I commit the change with Roger's R-b (and the cosmetic adjustments he did ask for)? (Unless I hear otherwise within the next day or two, I guess I'll assume so.) Jan
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