[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH 1/2] xen/arm: entry: Place a speculation barrier following an ret instruction
Hi Bertrand, On 18/08/2020 18:06, Bertrand Marquis wrote: I will introduce *_unsafe() helpers that will not contain the speculation barrier. It could then be used in place where we think the barrier is unnecessary.On 18 Aug 2020, at 17:43, Julien Grall <julien@xxxxxxx> wrote: On 18/08/2020 17:35, Bertrand Marquis wrote:Hi Julien,Hi Bertrand,Somehow we stopped on this thread and you did already most of the work so I think we should try to finish what you startedSorry this fell-through the cracks. I have a new version for patch #1, but not yet patch #2.No problem this came back while trying to reduce my todolist stack :-)I am still debating with myself where the speculation barrier should be added after the SMC :).I think that we should unless the SMC is in the context switch path (as all other calls should not have a performance impact). On 4 Jul 2020, at 17:07, Julien Grall <julien@xxxxxxx> wrote: On 17/06/2020 17:23, Julien Grall wrote:Hi, On 16/06/2020 22:24, Stefano Stabellini wrote:On Tue, 16 Jun 2020, Julien Grall wrote:From: Julien Grall <jgrall@xxxxxxxxxx> Some CPUs can speculate past a RET instruction and potentially perform speculative accesses to memory before processing the return. There is no known gadget available after the RET instruction today. However some of the registers (such as in check_pending_guest_serror()) may contain a value provided the guest.^ byIn order to harden the code, it would be better to add a speculation barrier after each RET instruction. The performance is meant to be negligeable as the speculation barrier is not meant to be archicturally executed. Note that on arm32, the ldmia instruction will act as a return from the function __context_switch(). While the whitepaper doesn't suggest it is possible to speculate after the instruction, add preventively a speculation barrier after it as well. This is part of the work to mitigate straight-line speculation. Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@xxxxxxxxxx>Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx> I did a compile-test on the patch too.--- I am still unsure whether we preventively should add a speculation barrier preventively after all the RET instructions in arm*/lib/. The smc call be taken care in a follow-up patch.SMC is great to have but it seems to be overkill to do the ones under lib/.From my understanding, the compiler will add a speculation barrier preventively after each 'ret' when the mitigation are turned on.So it feels to me we want to follow the same approach. Obviously, we can avoid them but I would like to have a justification for not adding them (nothing is overkilled against speculation ;)).I finally found some time to look at arm*/lib in more details. Some of the helpers can definitely be called with guest inputs. For instance, memchr() is called from hypfs_get_path_user() with the 3rd argument controlled by the guest. In both 32-bit and 64-bit implementation, you will reach the end of the function memchr() with r2/w2 and r3/w3 (it contains a character from the buffer) controlled by the guest. As this is the only function in the unit, we don't know what will be the instructions right after RET. So it would be safer to add a speculation barrier there too.How about adding a speculation barrier directly in the ENDPROC macro ?This would unfortunately not cover all the cases because you can return in the middle of the function. I will have a look to see if we can leverage it.I agree that it would not solve all of them but a big part would be solved by it. An other solution might be to have a RETURN macro encoded as "mov pc,lr; sb" and "ret; sb”. This is a bit messy on Arm32 because not all the return are using "mov pc,lr". Anyway, I will explore the two approaches. The patch sounds good, i just need to find a way to analyse if you missed a ret or not which is not easy with such a patch :-) I did struggle to find all the instances. The directory lib/ is actually quite difficult to go through on 32-bit because they are multiple way to implement a return.Finding a way to reduce manual speculation barrier would definitely be helpful. I will try to revise the patch during this week. Cheers, -- Julien Grall
|
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |