[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH v7 03/15] x86/mm: rewrite virt_to_xen_l*e
On 29.05.2020 13:11, Hongyan Xia wrote: > From: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx> > > Rewrite those functions to use the new APIs. Modify its callers to unmap > the pointer returned. Since alloc_xen_pagetable_new() is almost never > useful unless accompanied by page clearing and a mapping, introduce a > helper alloc_map_clear_xen_pt() for this sequence. > > Note that the change of virt_to_xen_l1e() also requires vmap_to_mfn() to > unmap the page, which requires domain_page.h header in vmap. > > Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx> > Signed-off-by: Hongyan Xia <hongyxia@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> with two further small adjustments: > --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c > @@ -4948,8 +4948,28 @@ void free_xen_pagetable_new(mfn_t mfn) > free_xenheap_page(mfn_to_virt(mfn_x(mfn))); > } > > +void *alloc_map_clear_xen_pt(mfn_t *pmfn) > +{ > + mfn_t mfn = alloc_xen_pagetable_new(); > + void *ret; > + > + if ( mfn_eq(mfn, INVALID_MFN) ) > + return NULL; > + > + if ( pmfn ) > + *pmfn = mfn; > + ret = map_domain_page(mfn); > + clear_page(ret); > + > + return ret; > +} > + > static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(map_pgdir_lock); > > +/* > + * For virt_to_xen_lXe() functions, they take a virtual address and return a > + * pointer to Xen's LX entry. Caller needs to unmap the pointer. > + */ > static l3_pgentry_t *virt_to_xen_l3e(unsigned long v) May I suggest s/virtual/linear/ to at least make the new comment correct? > --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/page.h > +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/page.h > @@ -291,7 +291,13 @@ void copy_page_sse2(void *, const void *); > #define pfn_to_paddr(pfn) __pfn_to_paddr(pfn) > #define paddr_to_pfn(pa) __paddr_to_pfn(pa) > #define paddr_to_pdx(pa) pfn_to_pdx(paddr_to_pfn(pa)) > -#define vmap_to_mfn(va) _mfn(l1e_get_pfn(*virt_to_xen_l1e((unsigned > long)(va)))) > + > +#define vmap_to_mfn(va) ({ \ > + const l1_pgentry_t *pl1e_ = virt_to_xen_l1e((unsigned long)(va)); \ > + mfn_t mfn_ = l1e_get_mfn(*pl1e_); \ > + unmap_domain_page(pl1e_); \ > + mfn_; }) Just like is already the case in domain_page_map_to_mfn() I think you want to add "BUG_ON(!pl1e)" here to limit the impact of any problem to DoS (rather than a possible privilege escalation). Or actually, considering the only case where virt_to_xen_l1e() would return NULL, returning INVALID_MFN here would likely be even more robust. There looks to be just a single caller, which would need adjusting to cope with an error coming back. In fact - it already ASSERT()s, despite NULL right now never coming back from vmap_to_page(). I think the loop there would better be for ( i = 0; i < pages; i++ ) { struct page_info *page = vmap_to_page(va + i * PAGE_SIZE); if ( page ) page_list_add(page, &pg_list); else printk_once(...); } Thoughts? Jan
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