[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH for-4.14] mm: fix public declaration of struct xen_mem_acquire_resource
On 24.06.2020 14:53, Paul Durrant wrote: >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> >> Sent: 24 June 2020 13:52 >> To: Julien Grall <julien@xxxxxxx> >> Cc: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>; xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; >> paul@xxxxxxx; Andrew >> Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>; George Dunlap >> <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx>; Ian Jackson >> <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>; Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>; >> Wei Liu <wl@xxxxxxx> >> Subject: Re: [PATCH for-4.14] mm: fix public declaration of struct >> xen_mem_acquire_resource >> >> On 24.06.2020 14:47, Julien Grall wrote: >>> Hi, >>> >>> On 24/06/2020 13:08, Jan Beulich wrote: >>>> On 24.06.2020 12:52, Julien Grall wrote: >>>>> Hi Jan, >>>>> >>>>> On 24/06/2020 11:05, Jan Beulich wrote: >>>>>> On 23.06.2020 19:32, Roger Pau Monné wrote: >>>>>>> On Tue, Jun 23, 2020 at 05:04:53PM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote: >>>>>>>> On 23.06.2020 15:52, Roger Pau Monne wrote: >>>>>>>>> XENMEM_acquire_resource and it's related structure is currently inside >>>>>>>>> a __XEN__ or __XEN_TOOLS__ guarded section to limit it's scope to the >>>>>>>>> hypervisor or the toolstack only. This is wrong as the hypercall is >>>>>>>>> already being used by the Linux kernel at least, and as such needs to >>>>>>>>> be public. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Actually - how does this work for the Linux kernel, seeing >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> rc = rcu_lock_remote_domain_by_id(xmar.domid, &d); >>>>>>>> if ( rc ) >>>>>>>> return rc; >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> rc = xsm_domain_resource_map(XSM_DM_PRIV, d); >>>>>>>> if ( rc ) >>>>>>>> goto out; >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> in the function? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> It's my understanding (I haven't tried to use that hypercall yet on >>>>>>> FreeBSD, so I cannot say I've tested it), that xmar.domid is the >>>>>>> remote domain, which the functions locks and then uses >>>>>>> xsm_domain_resource_map to check whether the current domain has >>>>>>> permissions to do privileged operations against it. >>>>>> >>>>>> Yes, but that's a tool stack operation, not something the kernel >>>>>> would do all by itself. The kernel would only ever pass DOMID_SELF >>>>>> (or the actual local domain ID), I would think. >>>>> >>>>> You can't issue that hypercall directly from userspace because you need >>>>> to map the page in the physical address space of the toolstack domain. >>>>> >>>>> So the kernel has to act as the proxy for the hypercall. This is >>>>> implemented as mmap() in Linux. >>>> >>>> Oh, and there's no generic wrapping available here, unlike for >>>> dmop. >>> >>> It is not clear to me the sort of generic wrapping you are referring to. >>> Are you referring to a stable interface for an application? >>> >>>> Makes me wonder whether, for this purpose, there should >>>> be (have been) a new dmop with identical functionality, to >>>> allow such funneling. >>> >>> I am not sure how using DMOP will allow us to implement it fully in >>> userspace. Do you mind expanding it? >> >> dmop was designed so that a kernel proxying requests wouldn't need >> updating for every new request added to the interface. If the >> request here was made through a new dmop, the kernel would never >> have had a need to know of an interface structure that's of no >> interest to it, but only to the tool stack. > > How would the pages get mapped into process address space if the > kernel doesn't know what's being done? Urgh, yes, silly me. Jan
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