[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH for-4.14] x86/tlb: fix assisted flush usage
On Mon, Jun 22, 2020 at 03:51:24PM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote: > On 22.06.2020 15:24, Roger Pau Monné wrote: > > On Mon, Jun 22, 2020 at 01:07:10PM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote: > >> On 22.06.2020 11:31, Roger Pau Monné wrote: > >>> On Fri, Jun 19, 2020 at 04:06:55PM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote: > >>>> On 18.06.2020 18:04, Roger Pau Monne wrote: > >>>>> Commit e9aca9470ed86 introduced a regression when avoiding sending > >>>>> IPIs for certain flush operations. Xen page fault handler > >>>>> (spurious_page_fault) relies on blocking interrupts in order to > >>>>> prevent handling TLB flush IPIs and thus preventing other CPUs from > >>>>> removing page tables pages. Switching to assisted flushing avoided such > >>>>> IPIs, and thus can result in pages belonging to the page tables being > >>>>> removed (and possibly re-used) while __page_fault_type is being > >>>>> executed. > >>>>> > >>>>> Force some of the TLB flushes to use IPIs, thus avoiding the assisted > >>>>> TLB flush. Those selected flushes are the page type change (when > >>>>> switching from a page table type to a different one, ie: a page that > >>>>> has been removed as a page table) and page allocation. This sadly has > >>>>> a negative performance impact on the pvshim, as less assisted flushes > >>>>> can be used. > >>>>> > >>>>> Introduce a new flag (FLUSH_FORCE_IPI) and helper to force a TLB flush > >>>>> using an IPI (flush_tlb_mask_sync). Note that the flag is only > >>>>> meaningfully defined when the hypervisor supports PV mode, as > >>>>> otherwise translated domains are in charge of their page tables and > >>>>> won't share page tables with Xen, thus not influencing the result of > >>>>> page walks performed by the spurious fault handler. > >>>> > >>>> Is this true for shadow mode? If a page shadowing a guest one was > >>>> given back quickly enough to the allocator and then re-used, I think > >>>> the same situation could in principle arise. > >>> > >>> Hm, I think it's not applicable to HVM shadow mode at least, because > >>> CR3 is switched as part of vmentry/vmexit, and the page tables are not > >>> shared between Xen and the guest, so there's no way for a HVM shadow > >>> guest to modify the page-tables while Xen is walking them in > >>> spurious_page_fault (note spurious_page_fault is only called when the > >>> fault happens in non-guest context). > >> > >> I'm afraid I disagree, because of shadow's use of "linear page tables". > > > > You will have to bear with me, but I don't follow. > > > > Could you provide some pointers at how/where the shadow (I assume > > guest controlled) "linear page tables" are used while in Xen > > context? > > See config.h: > > /* Slot 258: linear page table (guest table). */ > #define LINEAR_PT_VIRT_START (PML4_ADDR(258)) > #define LINEAR_PT_VIRT_END (LINEAR_PT_VIRT_START + PML4_ENTRY_BYTES) > /* Slot 259: linear page table (shadow table). */ > #define SH_LINEAR_PT_VIRT_START (PML4_ADDR(259)) > #define SH_LINEAR_PT_VIRT_END (SH_LINEAR_PT_VIRT_START + PML4_ENTRY_BYTES) > > These linear page tables exist in the Xen page tables at basically > all times as long as a shadow guest's vCPU is in context. They're > there to limit the overhead of accessing guest page tables and > their shadows from inside Xen. Oh, I have to admit I know very little about all this, and I'm not able to find a description of how this is to be used. I think the shadow linear page tables should be per-pCPU, and hence they cannot be modified by the guest while a spurious page fault is being processed? (since the vCPU running on the pCPU is in Xen context). Thanks, Roger.
|
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |