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Re: Event delivery and "domain blocking" on PVHv2
On 2020-06-19 19:42, Roger Pau Monné wrote:
On Fri, Jun 19, 2020 at 06:54:26PM +0200, Roger Pau Monné wrote:
On Fri, Jun 19, 2020 at 06:41:21PM +0200, Martin Lucina wrote:
> On 2020-06-19 13:21, Roger Pau Monné wrote:
> > On Fri, Jun 19, 2020 at 12:28:50PM +0200, Martin Lucina wrote:
> > > On 2020-06-18 13:46, Roger Pau Monné wrote:
> > > > On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 12:13:30PM +0200, Martin Lucina wrote:
> > > > > At this point I don't really have a clear idea of how to progress,
> > > > > comparing my implementation side-by-side with the original PV
> > > > > Mini-OS-based
> > > > > implementation doesn't show up any differences I can see.
> > > > >
> > > > > AFAICT the OCaml code I've also not changed in any material way, and
> > > > > that
> > > > > has been running in production on PV for years, so I'd be inclined
> > > > > to think
> > > > > the problem is in my reimplementation of the C parts, but where...?
> > > >
> > > > A good start would be to print the ISR and IRR lapic registers when
> > > > blocked, to assert there are no pending vectors there.
> > > >
> > > > Can you apply the following patch to your Xen, rebuild and check the
> > > > output of the 'l' debug key?
> > > >
> > > > Also add the output of the 'v' key.
> > >
> > > Had to fight the Xen Debian packages a bit as I wanted to patch the
> > > exact
> > > same Xen (there are some failures when building on a system that has
> > > Xen
> > > installed due to following symlinks when fixing shebangs).
> > >
> > > Here you go, when stuck during netfront setup, after allocating its
> > > event
> > > channel, presumably waiting on Xenstore:
> > >
> > > 'e':
> > >
> > > (XEN) Event channel information for domain 3:
> > > (XEN) Polling vCPUs: {}
> > > (XEN) port [p/m/s]
> > > (XEN) 1 [1/0/1]: s=3 n=0 x=0 d=0 p=33
> > > (XEN) 2 [1/1/1]: s=3 n=0 x=0 d=0 p=34
> > > (XEN) 3 [1/0/1]: s=5 n=0 x=0 v=0
> > > (XEN) 4 [0/1/1]: s=2 n=0 x=0 d=0
> > >
> > > 'l':
> > >
> > > (XEN) d3v0 IRR:
> > > ffff8301732dc200b
> > > (XEN) d3v0 ISR:
> > > ffff8301732dc100b
> >
> > Which version of Xen is this? AFAICT it doesn't have the support to
> > print a bitmap.
>
> That in Debian 10 (stable):
>
> ii xen-hypervisor-4.11-amd64 4.11.3+24-g14b62ab3e5-1~deb10u1.2
> amd64 Xen Hypervisor on AMD64
>
> xen_major : 4
> xen_minor : 11
> xen_extra : .4-pre
> xen_version : 4.11.4-pre
>
> >
> > Do you think you could also pick commit
> > 8cd9500958d818e3deabdd0d4164ea6fe1623d7c [0] and rebuild? (and print
> > the info again).
>
> Done, here you go:
>
> (XEN) Event channel information for domain 3:
> (XEN) Polling vCPUs: {}
> (XEN) port [p/m/s]
> (XEN) 1 [1/0/1]: s=3 n=0 x=0 d=0 p=33
> (XEN) 2 [1/1/1]: s=3 n=0 x=0 d=0 p=34
> (XEN) 3 [1/0/1]: s=5 n=0 x=0 v=0
> (XEN) 4 [0/1/1]: s=3 n=0 x=0 d=0 p=35
>
>
> (XEN) d3v0 IRR:
> 00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000
> (XEN) d3v0 ISR:
> 00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000
So there's nothing pending on the lapic. Can you assert that you will
always execute evtchn_demux_pending after you have received an event
channel interrupt (ie: executed solo5__xen_evtchn_vector_handler)?
I think this would be simpler if you moved evtchn_demux_pending into
solo5__xen_evtchn_vector_handler? As there would be less asynchronous
processing, and thus likely less races?
Having though about this, I think this model of not demuxing in
solo5__xen_evtchn_vector_handler is always racy, as it's not possible
to assert that you would always call evtchn_demux_pending after
solo5__xen_evtchn_vector_handler?
Ie: if you receive an interrupt just before going to sleep (after the
sti and before the hlt) you will execute
solo5__xen_evtchn_vector_handler and EOI the vector, but then
evtchn_demux_pending will never get called, and thus the interrupts
will stay indefinitely pending?
Aha! Thank you for pointing this out. I think you may be right, but this
should be possible without doing the demuxing in interrupt context.
How about this arrangement, which appears to work for me; no hangs I can
see so far and domU survives ping -f fine with no packet loss:
CAMLprim value
mirage_xen_evtchn_block_domain(value v_deadline)
{
struct vcpu_info *vi = VCPU0_INFO();
solo5_time_t deadline = Int64_val(v_deadline);
if (solo5_clock_monotonic() < deadline) {
__asm__ __volatile__ ("cli" : : : "memory");
if (vi->evtchn_upcall_pending) {
__asm__ __volatile__ ("sti");
}
else {
hypercall_set_timer_op(deadline);
__asm__ __volatile__ ("sti; hlt");
}
}
return Val_unit;
}
i.e. Always go to sleep with interrupts disabled, but before doing so
re-check that no events have become pending since the last time
evtchn_demux_pending() was called. This holds, since the only thing that
sets vi->evtchn_upcall_pending is Xen, and the only thing that clears it
is evtchn_demux_pending().
Right?
In an attempt to understand why the original PV code worked I re-read
the PV Mini-OS block_domain code again and realised that I had entirely
missed one part of its behaviour, which is that it intends[*] to run
with interrupts/upcalls disabled *all* the time and relies on
SCHEDOP_block atomically re-enabling them and triggering an upcall
before returning (PV) or "briefly enabling interrupts to allow handlers
to run" (HVM). We're doing the inverse, but our behaviour matches my
mental model of how things should work.
[*] AFAICT there's a bug in Mini-OS as ASSERT(irqs_disabled) is a no-op,
and block_domain is called with upcalls/interrupts enabled the first
time round. But I'm not 100% sure, and that code is a twisty little maze
of #ifdefs all alike.
Martin
Roger.
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