[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH for-4.14] x86/livepatch: Make livepatching compatible with CET Shadow Stacks
On 09/06/2020 14:41, Jan Beulich wrote: > On 08.06.2020 22:02, Andrew Cooper wrote: >> Do we ever write into .rodata? AFAICT, we introduce new fuctions for >> references to new .rodata, rather than modifying existing .rodata. If >> however >> we do modify .rodata, then the virtual regions need extending with >> information >> about .rodata so we can zap those dirty bits as well. > Inspired by looking at setup_virtual_regions(), do exception fixup > or bug frame tables possibly get patched? If they're not in .rodata, they really ought to be. That said, neither of those tables should get touched - we add new subset tables in the livepatch, which covers anything arising from modified code. This means we don't merge/resort the table on load, or edit the table at all on unload. > >> @@ -58,6 +59,10 @@ int arch_livepatch_safety_check(void) >> >> int arch_livepatch_quiesce(void) >> { >> + /* If Shadow Stacks are in use, disable CR4.CET so we can modify >> CR0.WP. */ >> + if ( cpu_has_xen_shstk ) >> + write_cr4(read_cr4() & ~X86_CR4_CET); >> + >> /* Disable WP to allow changes to read-only pages. */ >> write_cr0(read_cr0() & ~X86_CR0_WP); >> >> @@ -68,6 +73,29 @@ void arch_livepatch_revive(void) >> { >> /* Reinstate WP. */ >> write_cr0(read_cr0() | X86_CR0_WP); >> + >> + /* Clobber dirty bits and reinstate CET, if applicable. */ >> + if ( IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_XEN_SHSTK) && cpu_has_xen_shstk ) >> + { >> + unsigned long tmp; >> + >> + reset_virtual_region_perms(); >> + >> + write_cr4(read_cr4() | X86_CR4_CET); >> + >> + /* >> + * Fix up the return address on the shadow stack, which currently >> + * points at arch_livepatch_quiesce()'s caller. >> + * >> + * Note: this is somewhat fragile, and depends on both >> + * arch_livepatch_{quiesce,revive}() being called from the same >> + * function, which is currently the case. >> + */ >> + asm volatile ("rdsspq %[ssp];" >> + "wrssq %[addr], (%[ssp]);" >> + : [ssp] "=&r" (tmp) >> + : [addr] "r" (__builtin_return_address(0))); >> + } > To be safe against LTO I think this wants accompanying with making > both functions noinline. Hmm true. > As to the fragility - how about arch_livepatch_quiesce() returning > __builtin_return_address(0) to its caller, for passing into here > for verification? This would also make more noticeable that the > two should be be called from the same function (or else the "token" > would need passing further around). This I'm less certain about, as its fairly invasive to common code, just to bodge around something I don't expect to last very long into the 4.15 timeframe. > >> @@ -91,6 +92,18 @@ void unregister_virtual_region(struct virtual_region *r) >> remove_virtual_region(r); >> } >> >> +void reset_virtual_region_perms(void) >> +{ >> + const struct virtual_region *region; >> + >> + rcu_read_lock(&rcu_virtual_region_lock); >> + list_for_each_entry_rcu( region, &virtual_region_list, list ) >> + modify_xen_mappings((unsigned long)region->start, >> + ROUNDUP((unsigned long)region->end, PAGE_SIZE), >> + PAGE_HYPERVISOR_RX); >> + rcu_read_unlock(&rcu_virtual_region_lock); >> +} > Doesn't this result in shattering the trailing (and currently still > only) 2Mb page mapping .text in the xen.efi case? Not any more or less than its already clobbered by this logic in the alternatives path, I think? > With the > expectation of the approach changing in 4.15 this may not need > addressing, but should imo be mentioned as a shortcoming in the > description then. > > Also - how about "restore" instead of "reset"? Why? We're not passing some state sideways into the new mappings - we're resetting them to their expected values. > > Finally, while indeed not a lot of code, should it nevertheless go > inside #ifdef CONFIG_LIVEPATCH? Tbh, it could be CONFIG_XEN_SHSTK if we decide to go down that route. ~Andrew
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