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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH v2 for-4.14 3/3] xen/vm_event: Add safe to disable vm_event
On Wed, May 20, 2020 at 08:31:54PM -0600, Tamas K Lengyel wrote:
> Instead of having to repeatedly try to disable vm_events,
Why not use a hypercall continuation instead so that this is all
hidden from the caller?
I take that the current interface requires the user to repeatedly
issue hypercalls in order to disable vm_events until one of those
succeeds?
> request a specific
> vm_event to be sent when the domain is safe to continue with shutting down
> the vm_event interface.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
> xen/arch/x86/hvm/monitor.c | 14 ++++++++++++
> xen/arch/x86/monitor.c | 13 +++++++++++
> xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h | 1 +
> xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/monitor.h | 1 +
> xen/include/public/domctl.h | 2 ++
> xen/include/public/vm_event.h | 8 +++++++
> 7 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
> index e6780c685b..fc7e1e2b22 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
> @@ -563,15 +563,41 @@ void hvm_do_resume(struct vcpu *v)
> v->arch.hvm.inject_event.vector = HVM_EVENT_VECTOR_UNSET;
> }
>
> - if ( unlikely(v->arch.vm_event) &&
> v->arch.monitor.next_interrupt_enabled )
> + if ( unlikely(v->arch.vm_event) )
> {
> - struct x86_event info;
> + struct domain *d = v->domain;
> +
> + if ( v->arch.monitor.next_interrupt_enabled )
> + {
> + struct x86_event info;
> +
> + if ( hvm_get_pending_event(v, &info) )
> + {
> + hvm_monitor_interrupt(info.vector, info.type,
> info.error_code,
> + info.cr2);
> + v->arch.monitor.next_interrupt_enabled = false;
> + }
> + }
>
> - if ( hvm_get_pending_event(v, &info) )
> + if ( d->arch.monitor.safe_to_disable )
> {
> - hvm_monitor_interrupt(info.vector, info.type, info.error_code,
> - info.cr2);
> - v->arch.monitor.next_interrupt_enabled = false;
> + const struct vcpu *check_vcpu;
> + bool pending_op = false;
> +
> + for_each_vcpu ( d, check_vcpu )
> + {
> + if ( vm_event_check_pending_op(check_vcpu) )
Don't you need some kind of lock here, since you are poking at another
vCPU which could be modifying any of those bits?
> + {
> + pending_op = true;
> + break;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + if ( !pending_op )
> + {
> + hvm_monitor_safe_to_disable();
> + d->arch.monitor.safe_to_disable = false;
> + }
> }
> }
> }
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/monitor.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/monitor.c
> index f5d89e71d1..75fd1a4b68 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/monitor.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/monitor.c
> @@ -300,6 +300,20 @@ bool hvm_monitor_check_p2m(unsigned long gla, gfn_t gfn,
> uint32_t pfec,
> return monitor_traps(curr, true, &req) >= 0;
> }
>
> +void hvm_monitor_safe_to_disable(void)
> +{
> + struct vcpu *curr = current;
> + struct arch_domain *ad = &curr->domain->arch;
const
> + vm_event_request_t req = {};
> +
> + if ( !ad->monitor.safe_to_disable )
> + return;
Should this rather be an ASSERT? I don't think you are supposed to
call hvm_monitor_safe_to_disable when the bit is not set?
> +
> + req.reason = VM_EVENT_REASON_SAFE_TO_DISABLE;
I think you cat set the field at definition time.
> +
> + monitor_traps(curr, 0, &req);
> +}
> +
> /*
> * Local variables:
> * mode: C
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/monitor.c b/xen/arch/x86/monitor.c
> index 1517a97f50..86e0ba2fbc 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/monitor.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/monitor.c
> @@ -339,6 +339,19 @@ int arch_monitor_domctl_event(struct domain *d,
> break;
> }
>
> + case XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_SAFE_TO_DISABLE:
> + {
> + bool old_status = ad->monitor.safe_to_disable;
> +
> + if ( unlikely(old_status == requested_status) )
> + return -EEXIST;
> +
> + domain_pause(d);
> + ad->monitor.safe_to_disable = requested_status;
Maybe I'm missing something, but I don't see any check that others
events are disabled before safe_to_disable is set?
In the same way, you should prevent setting any events when
safe_to_disable is set IMO, likely returning -EBUSY in both cases.
Thanks, Roger.
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