[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH v2 for-4.14 3/3] xen/vm_event: Add safe to disable vm_event
On Wed, May 20, 2020 at 08:31:54PM -0600, Tamas K Lengyel wrote: > Instead of having to repeatedly try to disable vm_events, Why not use a hypercall continuation instead so that this is all hidden from the caller? I take that the current interface requires the user to repeatedly issue hypercalls in order to disable vm_events until one of those succeeds? > request a specific > vm_event to be sent when the domain is safe to continue with shutting down > the vm_event interface. > > Signed-off-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> > --- > xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- > xen/arch/x86/hvm/monitor.c | 14 ++++++++++++ > xen/arch/x86/monitor.c | 13 +++++++++++ > xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h | 1 + > xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/monitor.h | 1 + > xen/include/public/domctl.h | 2 ++ > xen/include/public/vm_event.h | 8 +++++++ > 7 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c > index e6780c685b..fc7e1e2b22 100644 > --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c > @@ -563,15 +563,41 @@ void hvm_do_resume(struct vcpu *v) > v->arch.hvm.inject_event.vector = HVM_EVENT_VECTOR_UNSET; > } > > - if ( unlikely(v->arch.vm_event) && > v->arch.monitor.next_interrupt_enabled ) > + if ( unlikely(v->arch.vm_event) ) > { > - struct x86_event info; > + struct domain *d = v->domain; > + > + if ( v->arch.monitor.next_interrupt_enabled ) > + { > + struct x86_event info; > + > + if ( hvm_get_pending_event(v, &info) ) > + { > + hvm_monitor_interrupt(info.vector, info.type, > info.error_code, > + info.cr2); > + v->arch.monitor.next_interrupt_enabled = false; > + } > + } > > - if ( hvm_get_pending_event(v, &info) ) > + if ( d->arch.monitor.safe_to_disable ) > { > - hvm_monitor_interrupt(info.vector, info.type, info.error_code, > - info.cr2); > - v->arch.monitor.next_interrupt_enabled = false; > + const struct vcpu *check_vcpu; > + bool pending_op = false; > + > + for_each_vcpu ( d, check_vcpu ) > + { > + if ( vm_event_check_pending_op(check_vcpu) ) Don't you need some kind of lock here, since you are poking at another vCPU which could be modifying any of those bits? > + { > + pending_op = true; > + break; > + } > + } > + > + if ( !pending_op ) > + { > + hvm_monitor_safe_to_disable(); > + d->arch.monitor.safe_to_disable = false; > + } > } > } > } > diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/monitor.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/monitor.c > index f5d89e71d1..75fd1a4b68 100644 > --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/monitor.c > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/monitor.c > @@ -300,6 +300,20 @@ bool hvm_monitor_check_p2m(unsigned long gla, gfn_t gfn, > uint32_t pfec, > return monitor_traps(curr, true, &req) >= 0; > } > > +void hvm_monitor_safe_to_disable(void) > +{ > + struct vcpu *curr = current; > + struct arch_domain *ad = &curr->domain->arch; const > + vm_event_request_t req = {}; > + > + if ( !ad->monitor.safe_to_disable ) > + return; Should this rather be an ASSERT? I don't think you are supposed to call hvm_monitor_safe_to_disable when the bit is not set? > + > + req.reason = VM_EVENT_REASON_SAFE_TO_DISABLE; I think you cat set the field at definition time. > + > + monitor_traps(curr, 0, &req); > +} > + > /* > * Local variables: > * mode: C > diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/monitor.c b/xen/arch/x86/monitor.c > index 1517a97f50..86e0ba2fbc 100644 > --- a/xen/arch/x86/monitor.c > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/monitor.c > @@ -339,6 +339,19 @@ int arch_monitor_domctl_event(struct domain *d, > break; > } > > + case XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_SAFE_TO_DISABLE: > + { > + bool old_status = ad->monitor.safe_to_disable; > + > + if ( unlikely(old_status == requested_status) ) > + return -EEXIST; > + > + domain_pause(d); > + ad->monitor.safe_to_disable = requested_status; Maybe I'm missing something, but I don't see any check that others events are disabled before safe_to_disable is set? In the same way, you should prevent setting any events when safe_to_disable is set IMO, likely returning -EBUSY in both cases. Thanks, Roger.
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