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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] xen/arm: Restrict access to most HVM_PARAM's
Hi Andrew, Thank you for stepping up and trying to make HVM_PARAM better :). On 10/02/2020 18:45, Andrew Cooper wrote: ARM currently has no restrictions on toolstack and guest access to the entire HVM_PARAM block. As the paging/monitor/sharing features aren't under security support, this doesn't need an XSA. Actually, only monitor is effectively working (yet not security supported) on Arm. The two others are x86 specific.
Should we move the XSM check here too? This is not too important though. The comment suggests {STORE, CONSOLE}_EVTCHN values should not be read/write. But you implement them as read/write. Is it intended? + */ + case HVM_PARAM_CALLBACK_IRQ: + case HVM_PARAM_STORE_PFN: + case HVM_PARAM_STORE_EVTCHN: + case HVM_PARAM_CONSOLE_PFN: + case HVM_PARAM_CONSOLE_EVTCHN: + case HVM_PARAM_PAGING_RING_PFN: + case HVM_PARAM_MONITOR_RING_PFN: + case HVM_PARAM_SHARING_RING_PFN: I would drop HVM_PARAM_PAGING_RING_PFN and HVM_PARAM_SHARING_RING_PFN as they are not used by Arm and AFAICT the toolstack will not set them. + return d == current->domain ? -EPERM : 0; + Looking at the list of HVM param, I think you forgot to add HVM_PARAM_VM_GENERATION_ID_ADDR. + /* Writeable only by Xen, hole, deprecated, or out-of-range. */ + default: + return -EINVAL; + } +} Cheers, -- Julien Grall _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
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