[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 5/9] x86/mem_sharing: use default_access in add_to_physmap
On 29.01.2020 15:05, Tamas K Lengyel wrote: > On Wed, Jan 29, 2020 at 6:27 AM Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> wrote: >> >> On 28.01.2020 18:02, Tamas K Lengyel wrote: >>> On Tue, Jan 28, 2020 at 9:56 AM Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>> >>>> On 27.01.2020 19:06, Tamas K Lengyel wrote: >>>>> When plugging a hole in the target physmap don't use the access permission >>>>> returned by __get_gfn_type_access as it can be non-sensical, leading to >>>>> spurious vm_events being sent out for access violations at unexpected >>>>> locations. Make use of p2m->default_access instead. >>>> >>>> As before, to me "can be non-sensical" is insufficient as a reason >>>> here. If it can also be a "good" value, it still remains unclear >>>> why in that case p2m->default_access is nevertheless the right >>>> value to use. >>> >>> I have already explained in the previous version of the patch why I >>> said "can be". Forgot to change the commit message from "can be" to >>> "is". >> >> Changing just the commit message would be easy while committing. >> But even with the change I would ask why this is. Looking at >> ept_get_entry() (and assuming p2m_pt_get_entry() will work >> similarly, minus the p2m_access_t which can't come out of the >> PTE just yet), I see >> >> if ( is_epte_valid(ept_entry) ) >> { >> *t = p2m_recalc_type(recalc || ept_entry->recalc, >> ept_entry->sa_p2mt, p2m, gfn); >> *a = ept_entry->access; >> >> near its end. Which means even a hole can have its access field >> set. So it's still not clear to me from the description why >> p2m->default_access is uniformly the value to use. Wouldn't you >> rather want to override the original value only if it's >> p2m_access_n together with p2m_invalid or p2m_mmio_dm (but not >> paged-out pages)? > > At this point I would just rather state that add_to_physmap only works > on actual holes, not with paged-out pages. In fact, I would like to > see mem_paging being dropped from the codebase entirely since it's > been abandoned for years and noone expressing any interest in keeping > it. In the interim I would rather not spend unnecessary cycles on > speculating about potential corner-cases of mem_paging when noone > actually uses it. > >> Of course then the question is whether there >> wouldn't be an ambiguity with p2m_access_n having got set >> explicitly on the page. But maybe this is impossible for >> p2m_invalid / p2m_mmio_dm? > > As far as mem_access permissions go, I don't know of any usecase that > would set mem_access permission on a hole even if by looks of it it is > technically possible. At this point I would rather just put this > corner-case's description in a comment. I think I would ack a revised patch having this properly explained. Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
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