[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v4 5/7] mm: make MEMF_no_refcount pages safe to assign
> -----Original Message----- > From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> > Sent: 29 January 2020 08:22 > To: Durrant, Paul <pdurrant@xxxxxxxxxxxx> > Cc: xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; Andrew Cooper > <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>; George Dunlap <George.Dunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>; > Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>; Julien Grall <julien@xxxxxxx>; > Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@xxxxxxxxxx>; Stefano Stabellini > <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>; Wei Liu <wl@xxxxxxx>; Volodymyr Babchuk > <Volodymyr_Babchuk@xxxxxxxx>; Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> > Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 5/7] mm: make MEMF_no_refcount pages safe to assign > > On 28.01.2020 18:01, Durrant, Paul wrote: > >> From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> > >> Sent: 28 January 2020 15:23 > >> > >> On 24.01.2020 16:31, Paul Durrant wrote: > >>> Currently it is unsafe to assign a domheap page allocated with > >>> MEMF_no_refcount to a domain because the domain't 'tot_pages' will not > >>> be incremented, but will be decrement when the page is freed (since > >>> free_domheap_pages() has no way of telling that the increment was > >> skipped). > >>> > >>> This patch allocates a new 'count_info' bit for a PGC_no_refcount flag > >>> which is then used to mark domheap pages allocated with > >> MEMF_no_refcount. > >>> This then allows free_domheap_pages() to skip decrementing tot_pages > >> when > >>> appropriate and hence makes the pages safe to assign. > >>> > >>> NOTE: The patch sets MEMF_no_refcount directly in > alloc_domheap_pages() > >>> rather than in assign_pages() because the latter is called with > >>> MEMF_no_refcount by memory_exchange() as an optimization, to > avoid > >>> too many calls to domain_adjust_tot_pages() (which acquires and > >>> releases the global 'heap_lock'). > >> > >> I don't think there were any optimization thoughts with this. The > >> MEMF_no_refcount use is because otherwise for a domain with > >> tot_pages == max_pages the assignment would fail. > >> > > > > That would not be the case if the calls to steal_page() further up > didn't > > pass MEMF_no_refcount (which would be the correct thing to do if not > > passing it to assign_pages(). > > No, that's not an option either: steal_page() would otherwise decrement > ->tot_pages, allowing the domain to allocate new memory on another vCPU. > This would again result in the exchange failing for no reason. (And no, > I don't think a guest should be required to serialize e.g. ballooning > operations with exchanges.) > Ok, yes it does make it non-atomic but my view would be that the guest should not be simultaneously ballooning; however, we clearly differ there. > >>> --- a/xen/common/page_alloc.c > >>> +++ b/xen/common/page_alloc.c > >>> @@ -460,6 +460,9 @@ unsigned long domain_adjust_tot_pages(struct > domain > >> *d, long pages) > >>> { > >>> long dom_before, dom_after, dom_claimed, sys_before, sys_after; > >>> > >>> + if ( !pages ) > >>> + goto out; > >> > >> Unrelated change? Are there, in fact, any callers passing in 0? > >> Oh, further down you add one which may do so, but then perhaps > >> better to make the caller not call here (as is done e.g. in > >> memory_exchange())? > > > > I think it's preferable for domain_adjust_tot_pages() to handle zero > > gracefully. > > That's an option, but imo would then better be a separate change (to > also drop present guards of calls to the function). Ok, I'll split it out into a separate patch. Paul > > Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
|
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |