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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 2/6] x86/boot: Map the trampoline as read-only


  • To: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  • From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Wed, 8 Jan 2020 15:51:26 +0000
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  • Cc: Xen-devel <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Wei Liu <wl@xxxxxxx>, Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>
  • Delivery-date: Wed, 08 Jan 2020 15:51:42 +0000
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  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>
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On 08/01/2020 11:08, Jan Beulich wrote:
> On 07.01.2020 20:04, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>> On 07/01/2020 16:19, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>> On 07.01.2020 16:51, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>>>> On 07/01/2020 15:21, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>> On 06.01.2020 16:54, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>>>>>> c/s ec92fcd1d08, which caused the trampoline GDT Access bits to be set,
>>>>>> removed the final writes which occurred between enabling paging and 
>>>>>> switching
>>>>>> to the high mappings.  There don't plausibly need to be any memory 
>>>>>> writes in
>>>>>> few instructions is takes to perform this transition.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> As a consequence, we can remove the RWX mapping of the trampoline.  It 
>>>>>> is RX
>>>>>> via its identity mapping below 1M, and RW via the directmap.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
>>>>> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
>>>>>
>>>>>> This probably wants backporting, alongside ec92fcd1d08 if it hasn't yet.
>>>>> This is just cleanup, largely cosmetic in nature. It could be argued
>>>>> that once the directmap has disappeared this can serve as additional
>>>>> proof that the trampoline range has no (intended) writable mappings
>>>>> anymore, but prior to that point I don't see much further benefit.
>>>>> Could you expand on the reasons why you see both as backporting
>>>>> candidates?
>>>> Defence in depth.
>>>>
>>>> An RWX mapping is very attractive for an attacker who's broken into Xen
>>>> and is looking to expand the damage they can do.
>>> Such an attacker is typically in the position though to make
>>> themselves RWX mappings.
>> This is one example of a possibility.  I wouldn't put it in the "likely"
>> category, and it definitely isn't a guarantee.
>>
>>>  Having as little as possible is only
>>> complicating their job, not making it impossible, I would say.
>> Yes, and?
>>
>> This is the entire point of defence in depth.  Make an attackers job harder.
>>
>> Enforcing W^X is universally considered a good thing from a security
>> perspective, because it removes a load of trivial cases cases where a
>> stack over-write can easily be turned into arbitrary code execution.
> Then let me ask the question differently: Did we backport any of the
> earlier RWX elimination changes? I don't recall us doing so.

I don't know if we did or not.

> Please
> don't get me wrong - I'm happy to be convinced of the backport need,
> but as always I'd like to take such a decision in a consistent (and
> hence sufficiently predictable) manner, or alternatively with a good
> enough reason to ignore this general goal.

If we didn't, then we really ought to have done.  There are real,
concrete security nice-to-haves from it.

~Andrew

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