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[Xen-devel] [PATCH V5 1/4] x86/mm: Add array_index_nospec to guest provided index values


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  • From: Alexandru Stefan ISAILA <aisaila@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Thu, 19 Dec 2019 09:42:53 +0000
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  • Cc: Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU <ppircalabu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@xxxxxxxxx>, Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Wei Liu <wl@xxxxxxx>, Razvan COJOCARU <rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>, Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>, Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@xxxxxxxxx>, Alexandru Stefan ISAILA <aisaila@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>
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  • Thread-topic: [PATCH V5 1/4] x86/mm: Add array_index_nospec to guest provided index values

This patch aims to sanitize indexes, potentially guest provided
values, for altp2m_eptp[] and altp2m_p2m[] arrays.

Requested-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Alexandru Isaila <aisaila@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
CC: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
CC: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
CC: Petre Pircalabu <ppircalabu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
CC: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
CC: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
CC: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
CC: Wei Liu <wl@xxxxxxx>
CC: "Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>
CC: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@xxxxxxxxx>
CC: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@xxxxxxxxx>
---
Changes since V4:
        - Change bounds check from MAX_EPTP to MAX_ALTP2M
        - Move array_index_nospec() closer to the bounds check.
---
 xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c | 15 +++++++++------
 xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c        | 20 ++++++++++++++------
 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c
index 320b9fe621..33e379db8f 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c
@@ -367,10 +367,11 @@ long p2m_set_mem_access(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, 
uint32_t nr,
     if ( altp2m_idx )
     {
         if ( altp2m_idx >= MAX_ALTP2M ||
-             d->arch.altp2m_eptp[altp2m_idx] == mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
+             d->arch.altp2m_eptp[array_index_nospec(altp2m_idx, MAX_ALTP2M)] ==
+             mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
             return -EINVAL;
 
-        ap2m = d->arch.altp2m_p2m[altp2m_idx];
+        ap2m = d->arch.altp2m_p2m[array_index_nospec(altp2m_idx, MAX_ALTP2M)];
     }
 #else
     ASSERT(!altp2m_idx);
@@ -426,10 +427,11 @@ long p2m_set_mem_access_multi(struct domain *d,
     if ( altp2m_idx )
     {
         if ( altp2m_idx >= MAX_ALTP2M ||
-             d->arch.altp2m_eptp[altp2m_idx] == mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
+             d->arch.altp2m_eptp[array_index_nospec(altp2m_idx, MAX_ALTP2M)] ==
+             mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
             return -EINVAL;
 
-        ap2m = d->arch.altp2m_p2m[altp2m_idx];
+        ap2m = d->arch.altp2m_p2m[array_index_nospec(altp2m_idx, MAX_ALTP2M)];
     }
 #else
     ASSERT(!altp2m_idx);
@@ -492,10 +494,11 @@ int p2m_get_mem_access(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, 
xenmem_access_t *access,
     else if ( altp2m_idx ) /* altp2m view 0 is treated as the hostp2m */
     {
         if ( altp2m_idx >= MAX_ALTP2M ||
-             d->arch.altp2m_eptp[altp2m_idx] == mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
+             d->arch.altp2m_eptp[array_index_nospec(altp2m_idx, MAX_ALTP2M)] ==
+             mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
             return -EINVAL;
 
-        p2m = d->arch.altp2m_p2m[altp2m_idx];
+        p2m = d->arch.altp2m_p2m[array_index_nospec(altp2m_idx, MAX_ALTP2M)];
     }
 #else
     ASSERT(!altp2m_idx);
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
index ba126f790a..16039c7a57 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
@@ -2574,6 +2574,7 @@ int p2m_init_altp2m_by_id(struct domain *d, unsigned int 
idx)
     if ( idx >= MAX_ALTP2M )
         return rc;
 
+    idx = array_index_nospec(idx, MAX_ALTP2M);
     altp2m_list_lock(d);
 
     if ( d->arch.altp2m_eptp[idx] == mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
@@ -2615,6 +2616,7 @@ int p2m_destroy_altp2m_by_id(struct domain *d, unsigned 
int idx)
     if ( !idx || idx >= MAX_ALTP2M )
         return rc;
 
+    idx = array_index_nospec(idx, MAX_ALTP2M);
     rc = domain_pause_except_self(d);
     if ( rc )
         return rc;
@@ -2686,11 +2688,13 @@ int p2m_change_altp2m_gfn(struct domain *d, unsigned 
int idx,
     mfn_t mfn;
     int rc = -EINVAL;
 
-    if ( idx >= MAX_ALTP2M || d->arch.altp2m_eptp[idx] == mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
+    if ( idx >= MAX_ALTP2M ||
+         d->arch.altp2m_eptp[array_index_nospec(idx, MAX_ALTP2M)] ==
+         mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
         return rc;
 
     hp2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d);
-    ap2m = d->arch.altp2m_p2m[idx];
+    ap2m = d->arch.altp2m_p2m[array_index_nospec(idx, MAX_ALTP2M)];
 
     p2m_lock(hp2m);
     p2m_lock(ap2m);
@@ -3030,10 +3034,12 @@ int p2m_set_suppress_ve(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, 
bool suppress_ve,
     if ( altp2m_idx > 0 )
     {
         if ( altp2m_idx >= MAX_ALTP2M ||
-             d->arch.altp2m_eptp[altp2m_idx] == mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
+             d->arch.altp2m_eptp[array_index_nospec(altp2m_idx, MAX_ALTP2M)] ==
+             mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
             return -EINVAL;
 
-        p2m = ap2m = d->arch.altp2m_p2m[altp2m_idx];
+        p2m = ap2m = d->arch.altp2m_p2m[array_index_nospec(altp2m_idx,
+                                                           MAX_ALTP2M)];
     }
     else
         p2m = host_p2m;
@@ -3073,10 +3079,12 @@ int p2m_get_suppress_ve(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, 
bool *suppress_ve,
     if ( altp2m_idx > 0 )
     {
         if ( altp2m_idx >= MAX_ALTP2M ||
-             d->arch.altp2m_eptp[altp2m_idx] == mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
+             d->arch.altp2m_eptp[array_index_nospec(altp2m_idx, MAX_ALTP2M)] ==
+             mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
             return -EINVAL;
 
-        p2m = ap2m = d->arch.altp2m_p2m[altp2m_idx];
+        p2m = ap2m = d->arch.altp2m_p2m[array_index_nospec(altp2m_idx,
+                                                           MAX_ALTP2M)];
     }
     else
         p2m = host_p2m;
-- 
2.17.1

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